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SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE JUDICIAL
RULE-MAKING POWER IN NEW MEXICO:
THE NEED FOR PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS
MICHAEL B. BROWDE* and M. E. OCCHIALINO**

I. INTRODUCTION
Separation of powers among the "co-equal" branches of government
is fundamental to our constitutional system. True to the eighteenth century
political theory of John Locke,' from which it derives, the separation of
powers doctrine is designed to prevent any one branch from dominating
the other two, thereby serving as a check against the tyranny of concentrated governmental power.'
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A. Brown University, 1965;
J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1968.
**Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A., Siena College, 1964; J.D.
Georgetown University Law Center, 1967.
The authors wish to thank a number of past students who assisted in the development of this
article. David Stout collected the early New Mexico history; Sarah Curry Smith provided us with
a review of the parallel developments in the fifty states; and Gretta Thomas reviewed the history
and present practices at the federal level. Bob Glennen helped to focus attention on the influence
of Dean Pound's writings. Judy Durzo assisted with our development of New Mexico law and helped
us smooth out numerous rough spots. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Gayle Fletcher and Carol
Kennedy for their careful, attentive, and expeditious word processing.
It should also be disclosed that the authors participated as counsel for a group of law firms, amici
curiae, in support of the writ of prohibition in State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769,
676 P.2d 1334 (1984), which is discussed in this Article.
1. Under Locke's theory of the social compact, by which civil governments are created, individuals
in an unstructured state of nature surrender a degree of their natural freedom in return for civil
protection of their natural rights. John Locke's Theory of Government, 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 825
(1981). In Locke's view each individual in nature has the power to preserve his property, and in so
doing, to judge and punish breaches of law by others. J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government
§ 87 (R. Cox ed. 1982). One of the failings of the state of nature is that it lacks "a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law." Id.
§ 125. In a political society, however, everyone has "quitted this natural power [to judge] [and]
resigned it [to] the community. [Tlhe community [becomes the] umpire..." Id. § 87.
Although the need for an independent judiciary is not addressed in Locke's unfinished treatise, a
government of limited powers is a basic tenet of his social compact theory. G. Mace, Locke, Hobbes,
and the Federalist Papers, 16-32 (1979). The separation of powers doctrine is therefore suggested
by Locke as a way to prevent governmental tyranny. Id.
2. Montesquieu more fully developed Locke's views into a functional theory of government
calling for the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers into three separate branches
of government:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body
there can be no liberty, because apprehensions might arise lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
[Similarly,] [t]here is no liberty if the judicial power be not separated from the
legislative and executive.
Montesquieu, Espirit des Lois, livre xi, chapitre vi, "De la Constitution d'Angleterre," quoted in
W. Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers in History, in Theory, and in the Constitutions
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The New Mexico Constitution follows the federal model of dividing
governmental powers among the three branches of government. Unlike
the federal constitution which only implies that the branches of government are separate, the New Mexico Constitution mandates that "no person
. ..charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
those departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either
of the others."3
In recent cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court has declared that this
provision requires that matters of pleading, practice, and procedure be
left to the exclusive control of the courts.4 The exclusivity of judicial
13-14 (1896). The views of Locke and Montesquieu were adopted by Blackstone in his reformulat-ion
of the importance of an independent judiciary to the preservation of liberty. See I W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 146 (1765).
The development of the doctrine of separation of powers from Locke and Montesquieu, to Blackstone, and through the British tradition into the American colonies is carefully reviewed in H.V.
Payne, Legislating or Judging? Another Look at the Separation of Powers Doctrine 1-15 (unpublished
manuscript on file at the New Mexico Law Review).
The framers of the Constitution perceived the creation of an independent judiciary as an essential
check on the other branches and as an essential part of a republican form of government. The
Federalist papers are replete with references to the role of the judiciary under the new Constitution.
Hamilton saw the judicial department as responsible for protecting the Constitution against abuses.
"A Constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the Judges, as a fundamental law." The Federalist
No. 78 at 542 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1891). The United States Constitution is "the standard
of construction for the laws, and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to
give place to the Constitution." The Federalist No. 81 at 561 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1891).
"It is ... rational to suppose, that the Courts were designed to be an intermediate body between
the People and the Legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority." The Federalist No. 78 at 542 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1891).
3. N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.Thirty-four states, including New Mexico, have express separation
of powers provisions in their constitutions. A list showing the language used in the constitutions of
these states is contained infra Appendix A. In the remainder of the states, as in the federal Constitution,
the doctrine is implied from the creation of separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government.
No court has relied on the distinction between express and implied separation of powers in deciding
whether the judiciary or the legislature has authority to adopt procedural rules. However, in the
absence of a specific constitutional provision giving rule-making power to the court, the principle
of exclusive judicial power to make procedural rules has been adopted only in those jurisdictions
having express separation of powers provisions. A list of states which have held that procedural rule
making is an exclusively judicial function is contained infra Appendix B.
The authority over rule-making power is further complicated in other states by constitutional
provisions which divide the authority between the legislature and the judiciary, and give final authority
to either the legislature or the court. A list showing those states and the particular provisions involved
is contained infra Appendix C.
4. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976) (rules of
testimonial privileges are solely within the prerogative of the court), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906
(1978); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975) (statutory quo warranto
procedural requirement exceeds power of legislature).
The supreme court has always acknowledged one significant limitation on its rule-making power.
That limitation is expressly recognized in the exception contained in N.M. R. Civ. P. 1, which
makes the Rules of Civil Procedure inapplicable in the face of "existing rules applicable to special
statutory or summary proceedings." In special statutory proceedings, "the procedure prescribed by
the statute must be strictly pursued. It is not a civil proceeding, and is not to be governed by any
of the rules of procedure in such cases." Hannett v. Mowrer, 32 N.M. 231, 232, 255 P. 636 (1927).
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power to write rules of procedure may appear to be a mundane matter
of limited interest. This relatively new constitutional principle,' however,
is but one example of the ongoing tension between the branches of government over the final authority to determine and to implement important
matters of public policy.
A fixed and definite allocation of authority among the branches of
The distinction is made between "the ordinary and usual actions known to the common law," which
are governed by the rules of procedure, and "those extraordinary actions and proceedings, providing
summary remedies wholly inconsistent with the liberal provisions" of the normal rules of procedure.
Gonzales v. Gallegos, 10 N.M. 372, 401, 62 P. 1103, 1106 (1900) (decided under the territorial
code of practice).
The New Mexico cases fail to consider the theoretical basis for not applying the normal procedural
rules to special "statutory or summary proceedings." That construct, however, is firmly rooted in
separation of powers principles. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, correlative to
Congress' power to create special tribunals "to examine and determine various matters, arising
between the government and others," is the congressional power to decide "the mode of determining
... Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). Thus, with the legislative
matters of this class.
power to establish new rights and responsibilities between a government and its people comes the
necessary power to determine the procedural mechanisms for the resolution of disputes with respect
to those rights and responsibilities.
The Crowell Court went on to note that even in cases involving "the liability of one individual
to another. . . . there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the
judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges." 285
U.S. at 51. The Court found sufficient Congressional authority over maritime jurisdiction to allow
Congress to delegate the power to resolve claims under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act to the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. See also, Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3337 (1985) (public rights doctrine merely reflects
"pragmatic understanding" that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of dispute resolution
that could be determined by the executive and legislative branches "the danger of encroaching on
the judicial powers is reduced.").
Unlike the federal model, and that of most other states, New Mexico has held firm to the "public
vs. private right" distinction, see State ex rel. Hovey v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069
(1957), thereby requiring that cases involving private rights be litigated only in the courts. Even
though New Mexico holds firm to the "private vs. public right" distinction for purposes of requiring
judicial rather than administrative resolution of disputes arising in purely private cases, it has extended
the Crowell rationale for legislative rule-making authority in special statutory proceedings by allowing
legislative procedures to govern in all instances where the legislature has created new substantive
rights or drastically altered the substantive rights which preexisted under the common law.
In New Mexico, "special statutory proceedings" include condemnation actions, State ex rel.
Highway Comm'n v. Burks, 79 N.M. 373, 443 P.2d 866 (1968), election contests, Hannett v.
Mowrer, 32 N.M. 231, 255 P. 636 (1927), workmen's compensation cases, Hudson v. Herschbach
Drilling Co., 46 N.M. 330, 128 P.2d 1044 (1942), actions in replevin, Citizens Bank of Farmington
v. Robinson Bros. Wrecking Co., 76 N.M. 408, 415 P.2d 538 (1966), and actions to quiet title,
Clark v. Primus, 62 N.M. 259, 308 P.2d 584 (1957).
When the state legislature, in a statutory proceeding, provides a procedure different from that in
the general rules of procedure, the legislative procedure must be strictly construed and fully complied
with. E.g., Hannett v. Mowrer, 32 N.M. 231, 232, 255 P. 636, 636 (1927). If, however, the
legislature expressly incorporates the district court rules as the procedure to be followed in the
statutory proceeding, or does not provide a conflicting procedure, then the existing district court
rules apply. See Ortega, Snead, Dixon & Hanna v. Gennitti, 93 N.M. 135, 140, 597 P.2d 745, 750
(1979); Bryant v. H.B. Lynn Drilling Corp., 65 N.M. 177, 334 P.2d 707 (1959).
5. It was not until the decision in State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936), that the
exclusivity of judicial rule-making power was even suggested in New Mexico. Prior to that time
the legislature and the judiciary shared rule-making power. See infra text accompanying notes 2082.
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government is often not possible and perhaps undesirable. 6 Some historic
confrontations between the branches of government have provided relatively clear guidelines, 7 but more often the branches seek to avoid the
direct confrontations which might require a clear determination of the
power of one over the other. Instead, the branches are more likely to test
the limits of their respective powers in relatively small skirmishes. The
latter process is often preferable because it provides the flexibility necessary to mold government institutions to meet the demand of an everchanging world.'
The subject of this article is the search for a proper balance between
the powers of New Mexico's legislative and judicial branches of government to establish rules governing pleading, practice, and procedure
for the courts of New Mexico. With respect to the rule-making power,
both the New Mexico Supreme Court and the New Mexico Legislature
have acted recently in ways which have unnecessarily fostered confrontation. In the recent cases declaring the exclusivity of judicial power to
promulgate procedural rules, 9 the court has declared invalid various statutes governing procedure. In retaliatory fashion, the New Mexico House
of Representatives proposed a constitutional amendment which would
have granted the legislature the final power to determine what matters
are procedural rather than substantive. '0 Although this proposed amendment was, in fact, an expression of legislative dissatisfaction with the
court's assertion of its common-law power to alter the tort doctrine of
6. While the tension among the branches of government derives from the constitutional structure
itself, the balance of those powers was greatly affected by the early establishment of the doctrine
of judicial review. Indeed, since Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), one of the
unending constitutional debates has been the proper balance between democratic rules through
legislative policy-setting, and the anti-democratic counterbalance of judicial review which at times
vitiates the majoritarian will and establishes a different policy. See, e.g., Burger, Ely's Theory of
Judicial Review, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 87 (1981).
7. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (legislative reapportionment); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege). In contrast, institutional struggles sometimes are resolved
by the application of general separation of powers principles to the specific fact pattern in ways
which do little more than decide the individual case. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. The early struggle in the development of administrative law to overcome the non-delegation
doctrine serves as a case in point. It took some creative judicial manipulation to overcome separation
of powers constraints against the delegation of legislative rule-making powers to administrative
agencies, see e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and the conferral of judicial-like
adjudicatory powers on administrative bodies, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 186-230.
10. H.R.J. Res. 16, 35th Leg., I Sess. (1981). This proposed constitutional amendment would
concede to the judiciary the power to promulgate rules of procedure, but would guarantee ultimate
authority to the legislative branch by granting the legislature the sole power to declare whether a
matter was procedural or substantive. Id. Under the proposal, a declaration by the legislature that
a particular matter is one "concerning the substantive law" is denominated as "solely within the
prerogative of the legislature." Id.
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contributory negligence, " its adoption also would have challenged the
supreme court's assertion of exclusive power to determine rules of procedure. 2
This Article surveys the history of the allocation of the power to make
procedural rules in New Mexico. In the process, it analyzes the judicial
opinions which have led to supreme court assertions of exclusive judicial
power to adopt procedural rules. It concludes with a call for a return to
the process of shared procedural rule-making power between the two
branches of government whenever possible, and proposes prudential
guidelines for determining the appropriate dividing line between the legislature and the courts when a choice between conflicting approaches is
necessary.
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A review of the history of judicial rule-making in New Mexico exhibits
a pendulum-like pattern in the quest for an appropriate balance between
legislative and judicial power to determine the rules of procedure. Initially,
the legislature was supreme. It exercised unchallenged authority to control
Il. See Albuquerque Journal, March 8, 1981, at A-10, Col. 5. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,
634 P.2d 1234 (1981), abolished contributory negligence and adopted comparative negligence as a
matter of the judicially-created common law of New Mexico. The case was decided just prior to
the 1981 legislative session. The Speaker of the House, sponsor of H.R.J. Res. 16, acknowledged
that the resolution was designed to preclude such common-law judicial law-making. Albuquerque
Journal, March 8, 1981, at A-10, col. 5. The House resolution accused the court of using the
procedural rubric to invade the policy-making sphere of the legislature. H.R.J. Res. 16, 35th Leg.,
ist Sess. (1981).
Judicial activism has continued since Scott in related common-law tort areas. In Bartlett v. New
Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336,
648 P.2d 794 (1982), the court applied comparative fault principles to alter joint and several liability
against co-tortfeasors. In Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982), the court extended
the common law to impose a duty on dram shops with respect to the serving of liquor to intoxicated
persons. Lopez followed two decisions of the supreme court which had declined to address the issue
and had instead invited legislative action. The first case, Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d
563
71 (1966), deferred to the legislature, while the second, Marciando v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367,
this
for
improper
be
it.would
that
feel
.
.
.
not
do
"[W]e
warned:
specifically
(1977),
1160
P.2d
P.2d
Court to address this issue in the future if the Legislature chooses not to act." Id. at 369, 563
at 1162. More recently, the court recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
See Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
In contrast, the supreme court recently reversed a decision of the court of appeals which would
695
have created the "seat belt defense" in New Mexico. See Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326,
matter
P.2d 476 (1985). The court explicitly declared that "the creation of a 'seat belt defense' is a
for the Legislature, not for the judiciary." Id. at 327, 695 P.2d at 477.
12. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976),
in
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). This application of the separation of powers doctrine arises
cases where the court invalidates legislative action as an invasion of the exclusive rule-making
branch by
prerogative of the court. Thus, the cases always involve a double blow to the legislative
the courts--first the invalidation of a legislative action, and second the declaration that the subject
matter is out of bounds for the legislature altogether.
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judicial procedure by statute.' 3 From the beginning, however, the legislature shared power with the judiciary by delegating a portion of what it
perceived to be the legislative power to the supreme court. 4 In turn, the
court acknowledged the supremacy of the legislature when implementing
rules of procedure pursuant to legislative authorization. 5 Thereafter, the
court accepted a partnership in rule-making power with the legislature
but insisted that the source of the court's authority was an inherent power
of the judiciary rather than a delegation of the rule-making authority from
the legislature. 6 The outer swing of the pendulum in favor of the judiciary
began in 1975 with the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in
State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride 7 and continued in 1976 with Ammerman
v. HubbardBroadcasting,Inc. " In these cases, the supreme court asserted
that the power to promulgate rules of procedure was not only inherent in
the judiciary, but also exclusive. According to the court, the legislature
lacked any power to participate in the rule-making process. Decisions
since 1980 suggest a return to the earlier approach of shared rule-making
power. "9
A. ProceduralRule-Making During New Mexico's Early History
1. The Kearney Code
The earliest body of local law governing New Mexico under the authority of the United States was the Kearney Code.2" Adopted in 1846,
it created a court system and allocated jurisdiction among the courts. 2' It
13. See infra text accompanying notes 20-69.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 70-82.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 113-85.
17. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
18. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 299-324.
20. See I N.M. Stat. Ann., Kearney Code of Laws (1846), 3-72 (1978). Brigadier General S.
W. Kearney prepared the code after the American occupation of Santa Fe in August 1846. President
Polk, through Secretary of War William L. Mercy, had given Kearney three directions-take Santa
Fe; establish a temporary civil government; and then move on to California. June 2, 1846, U.S.
War Department; Letters Sent; Records Group 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C. In order
to ensure a smooth transition, President Polk also ordered Kearney to retain as many local officials
as possible and as much local law as practicable. Id. Although Kearney declared void all Mexican
law inconsistent with his or United States law, he also incorporated a number of Mexican laws into
his code. The code was also based on the laws of Missouri, as well as the Livingston Code and the
laws of Texas. See 1 N.M. Stat. Ann., letter from General Kearney to the Adjutant General of the
United States, September 22, 1846 (1978).
Even though the Organic Act displaced the Kearney Code after fewer than five years as the
governing law of the New Mexico territory, see 1 N.M. Stat. Ann., Organic Act, §§ 1-19 (1978),
a number of its provisions have survived in substantially the same form to the present. For a more
detailed examination of Kearney's influence on New Mexico law, see R. Larson, New Mexico's
Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912 (1968).
21. The Kearney Code established the various courts of the territory-superior, circuit, prefect,
and alcalde. It also delimited their respective jurisdictions and set the times and places for them to
sit. I N.M. Stat. Ann., Kearney Code of Laws, Courts and Judicial Powers §§ 1-23, 1846 (1978).
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also contained many provisions which controlled matters of pleading,
practice, and evidence before the courts." The provisions of the code,
though numerous, do not represent a whole procedural system. Indeed,
the failure of the Kearney Code to address many of the necessary details
of judicial procedure23 suggests that the code, while controlling on matters
it addressed, probably was not intended to supplant existing court rules
24
and procedures which were not in conflict with the code. Statutes adopted
pursuant to legislative authority provided for in the Kearney Code also
dealt with judicial matters and procedure. 25
The Kearney Code demonstrates that, from the very beginning of American rule in New Mexico, the legislative component of the government
was authorized to establish rules of judicial procedure. The legislature
did not fully exercise its power, however, and the courts played some
role in the development of rules of procedure at the invitation of the
legislature. Indeed, the section of the Kearney Code dealing with pleadings expressly delegated limited rule-making power to the courts: "[Certain] pleadings shall be filed under oath, and in such time as the court
shall prescribe."2 6
2. The Territorial Period
In 1850, the United States government created the Territory of New
27
Mexico. The enabling legislation, the Organic Act, dealt with legislative
and judicial power in a manner typical of state constitutions---conferring
22. An entire division of the Code is entitled "Practice of Laws in Civil Suits." For example, the
code requires that "[aIll actions ... shall be commenced by petition, which shall contain a plain
statement of the names of the parties, the cause of action, and the relief sought; it shall be sworn
to before the clerk of the circuit court." I N.M. Stat. Ann., Kearney Code of Laws, Practice of
Law in Civil Suits, § 1, 1846 (1978). The code also requires that "[tihe defendant shall forthwith
file his answer under oath, fully admitting or denying or confessing and avoiding, every material
part of said petition." Id. § 12.
23. For example, while the code regulates the content of an answer, it sets no specific time limit
for filing and serving the document. Id. The defendant need only "forthwith" file an answer. Id.
24. This inference is supported by § I of the "Laws" division of the code, which provides that
"[aill laws heretofore in force in this territory, which are not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the
constitution of the United States and the laws thereof, or the statute laws in force for the time being,
shall be the rule of action and decision in this territory." 1 N.M. Stat. Ann., Kearney Code of Laws
§ 1 1846 (1978). Thus, the Kearney Code selectively imposed laws on the territory without interfering
with existing systems then in force which were not in conflict with the provisions of the code.
Historical evidence suggests that, even if the courts did not publish rules, they must have exercised
rule-making power at least on an ad hoc basis. One commentator has suggested that the supreme
court of the time was more a "sanctuary of the Grand Llama" than a court of law, A. Poldervaart,
Black-Robed Justice 24 (1948). Such an environment must certainly have given rise to the liberal
exercise of rule-making power.
25. E.g., "Act, regulating the holding of Circuit Courts," L. 1848 (December 1948). One act
concerning replevin provided, for example, that "[iln case the plaintiff fails to prosecute his suit
with effect, and without delay, judgment shall be given for the defendant." I N.M. Stat. Ann.,
Kearney Code of Laws § 7, 1848.
26. 1 N.M. Stat. Ann., Kearney Code of Laws, Practice of Laws in Civil Suits § 14, 1846,
(1978).
27. 1 N.M. Stat. Ann., Organic Act, 1850 (1978).
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the legislative and judicial power on separate branches of territorial government."
The Organic Act did not expressly address judicial rule-making authority, although it did assign to the legislature the power to determine
the jurisdiction of the courts29 and the rules governing the taking of
appeals. 30 In its first act dealing with the subject of the judiciary, the
territorial legislature adopted a statute which encompassed much more
than the two subject areas expressly delegated to the legislature by the
Organic Act. The Act of 185131 regulating practice in the courts clearly
was intended to cover most of the procedural field. Many of its fortyeight provisions dealt with technical procedural points, such as the notice
requirement before hearing motions,32 and the proper order of pleading
defenses. 33 Thus, the first relevant statute passed by the territorial legislature assumed that the legislature had the power to establish court
procedures even as to matters that the Organic Act failed to delegate
expressly to the legislative branch.
The ultimate power of the legislature to establish procedural rules was
confirmed by section nineteen of the Act of 185 1. This provision delegated
to the supreme court the power to adopt rules for itself and the district
courts so long as the rules were not inconsistent with the laws of the
territory.34 This section presumed that rule-making is a legislative prerogative while acknowledging that the power to establish some rules might
best be exercised by the courts within bounds set by the legislature.35
While it is likely that the territorial supreme court engaged in rulemaking soon after the Act of 185 1, the first published set of rules was
28. Id. The Organic Act did not expressly articulate a separation of powers doctrine for the
territory. Rather, like the federal constitution, it merely implied as much from the conference of the
various governmental powers to different branches of government. Compare U.S. Const. arts. I, II,
11, with I N.M. Stat. Ann., Organic Act, §§ 3, 5, 10 (1978).
29. "The jurisdiction of the several courts ... shall be as limited by law." 1 N.M. Stat. Ann.,
Organic Act, § 10 (1978).
30. "Writs of error ... shall be allowed . . . under such regulations as may be prescribed by
law." Id.
31. Act of June 2, 1851, 1851 N.M. Laws 141. "An act [r]egulating the practice in the District
and Supreme Courts of the Territory of New Mexico." Id.
32. After "three days notice shall have been given against the adverse party." Id. § 15.
33. The defendant must "file all ... exception[s] . . . at one and the same time." Id. § 25.
34. Section 19 statts:
The civil mode of practice is hereby adopted as the rule of practice in civil cases
in the several courts of this Territory, Provided that the Supreme Court may from
time to time, adopt such rules for its own government and that of the district
courts not inconsistent with the laws of the Territory, as it may deem proper.
Id. § 19.
35. Id. The rule-making provisions of the Act of 1851 were reiterated in the Act of February 2,
1859, ch. 24 1859 N.M. Laws 58, which (1) conferred rule-making authority on the court, id. §6,
(2) required that the rules not conflict with existing law, id. § 7, and (3) urged the Court in carrying
out its rule-making authority to "endeavor carefully to promote and secure justice and right, and
prevent injustice and delay," id. § 9.
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adopted in 1872.36 The 1872 rules made no reference to the authority
under which they were promulgated. They were extensive, establishing
37
supreme court rules and separate district court rules for law and equity.
Three features of the 1872 rules are of interest in the present context.
First, they contained provisions governing admission to the bar, despite
8
the lack of express statutory authority to do so. Second, the rules governing default were somewhat at variance with the corresponding provisions of the 1851 statute. 39 Finally, these early supreme court rules,
established the practice of sub-delegating rule-making authority to the
district courts so long as the local district court rules were not inconsistent
with the district court rules established by the supreme court.'
In 1880, the territorial legislature adopted the first statute establishing
4
a significant number of rules of evidence for the territorial courts. The
governing
statute, however, did not constitute a complete set of rules
evidence.4 2 The piecemeal nature of the statute suggests that the courts
were operating under judicially-created rules of evidence to the extent
that the legislature did not act.
The next developments of consequence 43 occurred in 1887 with the
passage of a specific statute allocating to the supreme court rule-making
36. A. Poldervaart, New Mexico Legal Research 91 (1955).
37. Rules Adopted at the Regular Term of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico in
the Month of January A.D. 1872, for the Regulation of Practice in the Supreme and District Courts,
Santa Fe, Manderfield & Tucker (1872).
38. Id. Either the court was exercising what it believed to be its inherent authority over this
subject, see, e.g., In re Sedillo, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162 (1959), or such authority could be
construed as consistent with the power to write any and all rules not inconsistent with statute which
the 1851 Act authorized.
39. Section 39 of the Act of 1851 calls for default in an action seeking a sum certain if, on the
third day of the term, no answer is filed. 1851 N.M. Laws 141 §39. The rule of court does not
limit the default judgment to cases dealing with liquidated sums, does not appear to follow the "third
day of the term" rule, and provides for reopening of defaults under circumstances not provided for
in the statute. See id.
The significance of this discrepancy, if it does exist, is that it is the first known instance in which
a court rule is inconsistent with a statutory regulatory procedure. The rule was unchallenged despite
the limitation on the supreme court to adopt rules of procedure only if consistent with legislative
enactments. See supra note 34.
40. "The District Courts may make such further rules in regard to the transaction of business
before them, respectively, not inconsistent with the foregoing rules, as they in their distinction may
deem necessary." 1872 Rules R. 28. The principle of judicial rule-making by lower courts has been
carried down to the present day. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 83.
41. "An Act Respecting Witnesses and Evidence," 1880 N.M. Laws 58. Prior to 1880, sporadic
legislation touched upon rules of evidence. E.g., Act of July 12, 1851, § 16, 1851 N.M. Laws 138
(admissibility at trial of deposition); Act of Jan. 7, 1874, ch. 28, 1874 N.M. Laws 49 (admissibility
at trial of authenticated transcripts of public records).
42. For example, no rules concerning hearsay evidence were included in the statute.
43. An 1880 statute was of minor import. It extended the term of the district court to allow it to
sit continuously. Act of Feb. 13, 1880, ch. 8, § 1, 1880 N.M. Laws 54. It also included a legislative
delegation of rule-making power to the district court to effectuate the change. Id. § 2. That law also
specifically allowed the district court to make rules in the absence of action by the supreme court.
Id.
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power and the subsequent court promulgation of rules. The Act of 1887
provided that the supreme court was "empowered to make and prescribe
rules regulating the practice in the supreme and district courts of the
territory, but such rules shall not conflict with any of the laws of the
United States or of the Territory of New Mexico."' The 1887 legislation
presupposed the primacy of the legislature in this field. "Not onlydid it
presume that an act of the legislature is required to give the court rulemaking power, but it also expressly confined the judicial power to the
adoption of rules that were not inconsistent with federal or territorial
statutes. Supreme court procedural rules were not to conflict with existing
statutes.
The 1888 rules45 adopted pursuant to the Act of 1887 did not greatly
alter the pre-existing rules. Significantly, however, the supreme court for
the first time expressly acknowledged that in promulgating the rules it
was exercising power conferred upon it by the legislature. The volume
containing the rules of 1881 begins: "Note. The following rules have
been prepared and published in perseverances of the directions contained
in Section 3 Chapter 72 of the laws of 1886-87."46 The statutory reference
is to the section of the statute which authorizes the court to adopt procedural rules and
which requires the Clerk of the Court to print and to
47
distribute them.

In 1897, the territorial legislature passed the first comprehensive statute
establishing a system of rules governing procedure in civil cases.48 The
statute comprised 182 well-drafted provisions covering every aspect of
pleading, practice, and procedure. In keeping with its comprehensive
scope, the 1897 statute repealed "all other laws and parts of laws" in
conflict with the act.49 Despite its breadth, the statute called for the
judiciary to develop procedural rules not covered by the statute. Section
177 authorized the court to "make such rules as may be necessary and
applicable to proceedings under the provisions of this act." 5
The same year the supreme court adopted a new set of rules in con44. Act of Feb. 24, 1887, § 1, 1886 N.M. Laws 72. This legislation also recognizes the preeminent
position of the supreme court within the judicial system by delegating to it, and not to the district
court, the power to write rules for the district court. Id. Unlike the 1880 statute, there was no
delegation of power to the district courts to make rules if the supreme court did not. See supra note
43.
45. Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico for the Regulation of Practice
in the Supreme and District Courts in force Jan. 1, 1888. Santa Fe, New Mexican Steam Printing
Co., 1887.
46. Id.
47. Act of Feb. 24, 1887, §53, 1886 N.M. Laws 72.
48. Act of Mar. 18, 1897, 1897 N.M. Laws 161. The statute included 182 separate sections
covering a wide range of procedural issues ranging from who may sue on an infant's behalf, see
id. § 9, to how many copies of the trial transcript the court stenographer must make, see id. § 174.
49. Id.§ 180.
50. Id.§ 177.
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formity with the new statute. It promulgated rules implementing the
merger of law and equity mandated by the 1897 statute, 5' formalizing the
bar examination which was to be overseen by a board of bar commissioners," and bringing the court's procedural rules into conformance with
the statute.53
In 1909, the legislature adopted a statute which evidenced its perception
that it had authority to regulate admission to the bar and disbarment
proceedings.5 4 The statute set the qualifications for admission to the bar,55
established a list of subjects which were to be covered on the bar examination, 6 enumerated 56
the grounds for disbarment and suspension, 17
and established the procedures in disbarment and suspension proceedings. 5' At the same time, the legislation created a Board of Bar Examiners,5 9 authorized the supreme court to appoint the board's members,"
and delegated to the court the power to try lawyers in disbarment proceedings.6 One carefully drafted provision seemed to acknowledge that
the court had ultimate power to regulate the practice of law within the
state. Section 21 provided that "the power to issue certificates to persons
to practice law ...is vested exclusively in the supreme court." 62 Yet,
another section mandated disbarment of lawyers found guilty of certain
crimes," while allowing the court to determine whether a punishment
less than disbarment was appropriate in other instances of misconduct. 4
One reading of this statute indicates that the legislature did not delegate
power to the judiciary to regulate the bar, but merely acknowledged the
judiciary's inherent power to do so. 65 The legislation, however, is far too
intrusive to support this construction. A more likely construction is that
51. See id. § 1:"There shall be in this Territory but one form of action .. .which shall be
denominated a civil action .. "
52. Rule 2 § 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico for the Regulation
of Practice in the Supreme and District Courts, adopted August 25, 1897, in force Sept. 1,1897,
Santa Fe, New Mexico Printing Co. 1897, p. 57.
53. For example, Rule 24 of the 1893 rules of the court, Rules of the Supreme Court of the
Territory of New Mexico for the Regulation of Practice in the Supreme and District Courts, adopted
August 26, 1893, provided for service of process in a manner inconsistent with the 1897 statute.
The 1897 procedure rules call for service "inthe manner provided by law." Id. at Rule 23.
54. Act of Mar. 17, 1909, ch. 53, 1909 N.M. Laws 138.
55. Id.§ 14.
56. Id.§ 7. The statute mandated that the examination cover 19 subjects "and such other subjects
...as the board shall direct." Id.
57. Id. § 34.
58. Id.§§ 36-45.
59. Id.§ 1.
60. Id.
61. Id.§43.
62. Id.§21.
63. Id.§ 35.
64. Id.§34.
In re Sedillo, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162 (1959).
65. See, e.g.,
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the legislature asserted authority over most aspects of the practice of law,
while delegating a significant role in the process to the court.
This short historical sketch illustrates that the legislature was the dominant force in rule-making in territorial New Mexico. Time after time,
the legislature assumed power to determine the rules of procedure. The
judiciary never challenged the legislative prerogative. Every facet of
judicial power was included within the legislative grasp, from the adoption
of the almost all-encompassing procedure statute of 189766 to the legislative development of rules of evidence67 to the control of the qualifications for admission to the bar and grounds for disbarment.6" At the
same time, the legislature delegated some of the rule-making power to
the judiciary.69 The 1887 statute is paradigmatic: the legislature was supreme to the extent that it chose to act, and the supreme court was
authorized to fill in details omitted from the legislation. Shared responsibility for rule-making, with the legislature holding the power to prevail
if conflicts arose, was obviously a satisfactory arrangement for the era.
3. The Early Years of Statehood
On January 6, 1912, nearly one year after the adoption of the New
Mexico Constitution, President William Howard Taft breathed life into
that document by signing the proclamation admitting New Mexico into
the Union.7 ° Under the new constitution the more explicit separation of
powers provision of article III, section 171 replaced the implied, separation
of powers contained in the Organic Act. The constitution also explicitly
provided that the supreme
court "shall have a superintending control over
72
all inferior courts."

The actions of the legislature and the supreme court in the early years
of statehood do not suggest that the new constitutional provisions had
any bearing on the relative rule-making powers of the legislature and the
courts. 73 Indeed, two provisions in the constitution almost compel the
66. 1897 N.M. Laws, ch. 73. The statute did not apply to habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto, replevin, or attachment. Act of 1897, ch. 73, § 175, 1897 N.M. Laws 192.
67. Act of Feb. 5, 1880, 1880 N.M. Laws 58. "An Act Respecting Witnesses and Evidence."
Id.
68. Act of Mar. 17, 1909, ch. 53, 1909 N.M. Laws 138.
69. Act of 1887, § 1, 1887 N.M. Laws 72.
70. Proclamation of January 6, 1912, 37 Stat. 1723 (1912).
71.
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments ... and no persons or collection of persons charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution
otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.
72. N.M. Const. art. VI, §3.
73.
[I]f
the practice and procedure or rule making power of the courts was made
within the cognizance of the territorial legislature, and if the legislature exercised
that power at all times, then the framers of the Constitution must be held to have
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conclusion that the framers of the constitution accepted the premise of
legislative rule-making power which had keynoted the territorial experience. Article IV of the constitution, which deals with the legislative
branch, provides that "no act of the legislature shall affect the right or
remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in
any pending case." 74 This prohibition against retroactive applications of
procedural and evidentiary statutes presupposes that the legislature has
the power to establish prospectively rules of procedure and evidence.75
To the same effect is the constitutional provision declaring that the legislature "shall not pass local or special laws .

.

. regulating . . . the

practice in courts of justice." 76 This provision implies that general laws
regulating procedure are permissible.
Immediately after statehood, the supreme court continued to acknowledge that it was exercising authority delegated to it by the legislature77
when exercising rule-making authority. In 1917, the legislature repealed
several statutes dealing with appellate procedure and provided new statutory provisions governing appellate practice. 7' The legislature followed
the pattern established prior to statehood by including in the statute a
section delegating rule-making power to the court so long as those "rules
shall not conflict with any laws in force in this state. 7
Thus, the period immediately following statehood in New Mexico
followed the pattern established during the territorial period. The state
constitution seemed to confirm the existence of legislative authority over
procedure. The legislature assumed that it had the power to write statutes
governing judicial procedure and acted accordingly. The legislature conintended to confer the same power upon the state legislature, unless the contrary
appears. That they intended to deny that power to the state legislature, theretofore
exercised by the territorial legislature, is not apparent from anything contained
in the Constitution, so that we think it may be safely said that the grant of all
legislative power by the Constitution to the state legislature includes such powers
as were theretofore exercised by the territorial legislature in addition to those
additional powers belonging to a legislature of a sovereign state. . . . I believe
. . . that the framers of the Constitution in the grant of legislative and judicial
power intended to grant to the state legislature and courts the same powers
theretofore exercised by these branches of the territorial government as long as
they were compatible and consistent with the new state government.
Brief of M.C. Mechem, Amicus Curiae, at 2-3, 12, State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936)
(on file in the records of the case, University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
74. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34.
75. But see Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969) (N.M.
Const. art. III, § 1 precludes construction of the constitution which would impliedly authorize
legislative adoption of procedural rules). See infra note 147.
76. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 24.
77. For example, the supreme court rules of 1912 specifically refer to § 15 of the Law of 1909
as the basis for its authority to adopt rules pertaining to bar admission. Rules of Sup. Ct. State of
N.M. 1912 p. 10 ch. 53 Rule 8.
78. Act of Mar. 10, 1917, ch. 43 1917 N.M. Laws 144.
79. Id. § 43.
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tinued to delegate to the supreme court the power to adopt additional
procedural rules that were consistent with those promulgated by the legislature. This continued pattern of shared responsibility must have satisfied
both branches of government, for there were no reported conflicts between
the legislature and the judiciary over the rule-making power during the
first decade after statehood.
The allocation of rule-making power was a matter of little consequence
during our early history. The exercise of legislative power in this field
was quite natural. It was easily assumed that the legislature had the power
to create the rules under which the courts would be governed. 80 Furthermore, the legal training of the period conditioned lawyers and legislators
to assume that judicial rule-making was a proper subject for legislative
control. 8 The natural tendency of the judges of the time was to look for
legislative rules or legislative authority for the courts to promulgate rules.82
Because such authority existed in the statutes, there was no practical need
for further inquiry.
The procedural rule-making power was not a source for separation of
powers concerns in the laws or practices of New Mexico prior to or in
the early years of statehood. Instead, the influence of doctrinal developments outside New Mexico triggered the early antecedents of our current conflict concerning the role of the doctrine of separation of powers
in the judicial rule-making area.

80. In this regard the New Mexico experience parallels that which existed generally. One perceptive observation of the early English experience is equally applicable to the early American courts:
There should be little doubt that at a time when the courts were in their formative
stage the question of who should prescribe rules of procedure was not hotly
contested. In the first place, no one but the courts was interested. And so far as
the courts were concerned, we can well imagine it was not so much a question
of power as of necessity.
Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A. J. 772,
773 (1936).
81. The creation of the New Mexico territory and subsequent statehood followed the nineteenth
century overhaul of procedure which took place through legislative enactments. See, e.g., The Field
Code of 1848, 1848 N.Y. Laws 379. As Dean Pound pointed out:
[B]oth in England and in America, the nineteenth century overhauling of procedure
took place at a time when men turned naturally to the legislature to take the lead
in all things. . . . It took place when there had come to be a long tradition of
parliamentary sovereignty in England and the de facto hegemony of the legislative
in America was unchallenged.
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 599-600 (1926). [hereinafter cited
as Pound III].
82. Dean Pound assigned three reasons for judicial reliance on legislative rule-making authority:
(1) the "over-conservatism of the legal profession"; (2) the lack of judicial models for remaking
procedure; and (3) the apprenticeship mode of legal education which focused on the details of local
procedure, equating law with procedure, which thus fostered a belief that separation of powers
required that procedure be left to the legislature. Pound III, supra note 81, at 600-01.
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B. The Quest for ProceduralReform and the Rise of JudicialRuleMaking Power
1. The Influence of Roscoe Pound
The most significant external influence on the development of New
Mexico procedural law may have been the work of Dean Roscoe Pound,
whose articles and speeches in the 1920's urged that the judiciary take a
dominant role in procedural rule-making. In the early twentieth century
there was a concerted push for procedural reform in the courts of the
United States. The leading proponent of that movement was Roscoe
Pound. His seminal articles on the subject83 laid the groundwork for a
generation-long debate which resulted in adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1938.84 Part of that debate focused on the issue of
whether the legislature or the judiciary should spearhead the reforms.
Dean Pound's thesis was that courts must play a leading role in the
formulation of procedural rules. 8' To counter the argument that judicial
activism without statutory authority would infringe on the legislative
prerogative, 86 Dean Pound argued that the rule-making power of the courts
was very much a part of the judicial function at the time of the adoption
of American constitutions. 87 This historical rebuttal, however, laid the
groundwork for the more radical theory that judicial rule-making was
exclusively a judicial function.
Prior to the Pound articles, most other jurisdictions were in a position
similar to that of New Mexico. Legislative authority over procedure was
assumed, and courts acted only interstitially at the invitation of the respective legislatures to fill in procedural details not inconsistent with
statutory law.88 Occasionally, courts would suggest that the judiciary
83. Pound III, supra note 81; Regulation of JudicialProcedure by Rules of Court, 10 Ill. L. Rev.
163 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Pound II]; Pound, Some Principles of ProceduralReform, 4 Ill. L.
Rev. 388 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Pound I].
84. For a discussion of the development of the federal approach to rule-making authority questions
which avoided any legislative-judicial clash, see infra note 140.
85. See, e.g., Pound I, supra note 83, at 403-07.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 96-101.
87. See Pound II, supra note 83, at 170-75.
88. The early experience in other states mirrored that of New Mexico. Shared legislative and
judicial authority with the legislature having the final say was the norm and the subject was not a
matter of contention. Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8
Conn. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1975); Currie & Rash, The Separation of Powers Control of Courts and
Lawyers, Dec. 1974 Wisc. Bar Bull. 7; Note, The Rule-Making Powers of the Illinois Supreme
Court, 1965 Ill. L. F. 903, 907 (1965). See also State v. Fifth Circuit Judges, 37 La. Ann. 596
(1885); Purcell v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co., 50 Mo. 504 (1872); Brooks v. Boswell, 34 Mo. 474
(1864); Fox, Stevens v. Ross, 1 Cal. 94 (1850).
Where judicial authority over rule-making was asserted, it was done to fill in details. See, e.g.,
Snyder v. Bauchman, 8 Serg. & Rawle 336, 338 (Pa. 1822) ("Without this [rule-making] power,
it would be impossible for courts of justice to dispatch the public business. Delays [waiting for
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possessed an inherent rule-making power which flowed from its power
to regulate its own business89 or its power to provide the "litigant...
the relief which the court has the power to grant.'"' A few early decisions
even hinted that the judicial rule-making power had constitutional underpinnings, 9 but there was no general consensus that courts had a constitutional right or duty to develop procedural rules.
It was against this backdrop that Dean Pound began his campaign for
reform. In 1909, in an article urging many procedural reforms, Pound
proposed ten comprehensive principles "to insure precision, uniformity
and certainty in the judicial application of substantive law." 92 The third
principle Dean Pound enunciated was that "[a] practice act should deal
only with the general features of procedure . . . leaving details to be
fixed by rules of the court. "93 In the course of his discussion, Dean Pound
elaborated on the advantages of such a system94 and dealt with the major
practical objections to an increased judicial role in rule-making.95 The
1909 article was devoid of any suggestion that only the judiciary has rulemaking authority. It assumed legislative competence and implied that a
legislative delegation of increased rule-making power to the courts is the
appropriate vehicle for increasing the role of the courts in judicial rulemaking.
In 1915,96 Dean Pound found it necessary to rebut a fundamental
objection to his proposal-the assertion that making rules of procedure
is exclusively a legislative function, barred by the doctrine of separation
inactments] would be interminable ..
"); Barry v. Randolph, 3 Binn. 276, 278 (Pa.-810) ("[C]ourts
must necessarily have the power of framing such rules, as they think best calculated to carry the
laws into execution with convenience and despatch [sic].") Even then, most courts acknowledged
that they could only write rules not inconsistent with statutory rules of procedure. See, e.g., Beveridge
v. Hewitt, 8 11. App. 467 (1881); Coyote G. & S.M. Co. v. Ruble, 9 Or. 121 (1881); Carney v.
Barrett, 4 Or. 171 (1871); Twaddle v. Winters, 29 Nev. 88, 89 P. 289 (1907).
89. See Prindeville v. People, 42 Il1. 217, 221 (1866). The power is a practical one, to ensure
that "the time of the court shall not be unnecessarily consumed in the trial of causes." Id. See also
State v. Van Cleave, 157 Ind. 608, 62 N.E. 446 (1902); Maloney v. Hunt, 29 Mo. App. 379 (1888);
Gannon v. Fritz, 79 Pa. 303 (1875).
90. Finlen v. Heinze, 69 P. 829, 832, (Mont. 1902).
91. See Vanatta v. Anderson, 3 Binn. 416, 423 (Pa. 1811) "[lt is not denied that [the courts]
have power from the nature of the constitution, to make rules for the regulation of their practice."
See also Lee v. Baird, 146 N.C. 361, 59 S.E. 876 (1907) (state constitutional provision giving court
appellate rule-making authority).
92. Pound I, supra note 83, at 388.
93. Id. at 403.
94. Id. at 404.
95. Id. at 404-06. Dean Pound outlined and sought to rebut four arguments against his proposal:
(1) that the condition of cumbersome adjective law was the fault of the courts in the first place; (2)
that bench and bar were hostile to change; (3) that even a general statute would create confusion
for many years, until its interpretation was finally settled; and (4) that judges did not have the time
to undertake the task of procedural reform. Id.
96. Pound II, supra note 83.
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of powers from delegation to the judiciary.97 He began his response by
suggesting that separation of powers "does not prescribe an exact analytical scheme." 98 Instead, he argued that separation of powers requires
resort to an historical review of what legislative matters were deemed
proper subjects of legislative delegation to the courts at the time of the
making of state constitutions.' He then made a persuasive case for the
historical power of English and early American courts to promulgate rules
of court."° Dean Pound concluded that the United States had inherited
the English system of regulating practice by judicial rules "prior to the
taking over of the subject by the legislatures.".o.
Dean Pound's central thesis in the 1915 article remained the same as
stated in the 1909 article: The legislature had rule-making power, but
should delegate some or all of that power to the judiciary. His discussion
of separation of powers was not intended to make an argument that only
the judiciary had the power to write procedural rules."°2 Rather, it was
intended to demonstrate that a legislative delegation of rule-making authority to the judiciary was not violative of a constitution simply because
that constitution did not expressly grant that power to the judiciary.
Having supported the power of the legislature to delegate increased
rule-making power to the judiciary, Dean Pound offered two alternative
statutory models for achieving the transference of power:
One is the method ..

adopted in Colorado, namely, to commit the

97. Id. at 169-70. "[Olne objection remains namely, the point urged in several recent discussions
in bar associations, that making rules of procedure is a legislative function and hence that the proposal
to commit this matter to the judges contravenes constitutional provisions as to the separation of
powers." Id.
98. Id. at 170.
99. Id. Pound quoted with approval from State v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250 (1877): "What
constitutes judicial power within the meaning of the constitution is to be determined in the light of
the common law and of the history of our institutions as they existed anterior to and at the time of
the adoption of the constitution." Id. (quoting Harmon, 31 Ohio St. at 258).
100. Pound II, supra note 83, at 170-74. For further discussion of the early English antecedents
of judicial rule-making power, see, e.g., Tyler, The Originof the Rule-Making Power and its Exercise
by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A. J. 772 (1936).
101. Pound II, supra note 83, at 171. Dean Pound was able to point to an early precedent in the
United States Supreme Court, where in response to an inquiry from the Attorney General, the Chief
Justice stated: "The Court considers the practice of the courts of King's Bench and Chancery in
England as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from time to time,
make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render necessary." Id. (quoting Hayburns Case,
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 411 (1792)).
At one point, however, Dean Pound argued that "the power to govern procedure by general rules
has been universally regarded as part of the judicial function. Pound II, supra note 83 at 172. Even
here, Dean Pound's thesis was not that the courts had exclusive rule-making power, but only that
the court's power to write rules, whether derived from a legislative delegation or an inherent power,
was a power properly shared with the legislature. Id. Pound seemed to concede that the legislature
could assert its dominance if it wanted to do so. See id.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
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whole subject of procedure in its entirety to rules of court. . . . The
alternative method is . . . to frame a short practice act covering what

are deemed the essential principles in a few sections and to commit
everything else to rules of court. 3
Both alternatives grant rule-making power to the judiciary. Both assume
that the legislature has a legitimate role to play in the rule-making process.
The "short practice act" alternative expressly acknowledges the superiority of the legislature. It obviously anticipates that the legislative limits
set in the initial statute and subsequent amendments could and would
supersede judicially-created court rules. In contrast, the Colorado statute,
preferred by Dean Pound," 4 totally delegates the rule-making power to
the courts. It anticipates that, while the legislature might continue to
adopt procedural statutes, the judiciary would make the final decision
when a conflict between a court rule and a legislative enactment arose. 105
By 1926, Dean Pound's views on the matter of judicial rule-making
had become more inflexible. In a speech to the American Bar Association
that year Pound reiterated his earlier view that, in order to fashion the
necessary reforms, the power to make procedural rules must be returned
to the courts. 10 6 Pound extended the constitutional argument in this speech
by suggesting that while the legislature "may" enact codes of procedure
it ought to refrain from so doing "as a matter of due regardfor the
constitutionalsystem of separation of powers."'0'7 Pound suggested that
only the prior history of judicial deference to legislative activity precluded
a claim that the rule-making power was exclusively a function of the
judicial branch: "It may be that today, after seventy-five years of codes
and practice acts and prolific procedural legislation, we can't go so far
as to pronounce such legislative interference with the operations of a
coordinate department to be unconstitutional."'0 8 Dean Pound's respect
103. Pound II, supra note 83, at 175-76.
104. Id. at 176.
105. The Colorado statute provided that:
Section 1. The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of practice and procedure
in all courts of record and may change or rescind the same. Such rules shall
supersede any statute in conflict therewith. Inferior courts of record may adopt
rules not in conflict with such rules or with statutes. Section 2. All acts or parts
of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
"An Act Concerning Practice and Procedure in Courts of Record," ch. 121, 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws
447. Because the statute declares that rules of court "shall supersede any contrary statute," this
provision constitutes a total abrogation of both rule-making authority and the authority to reverse a
rule by a subsequent statute. Only if the Colorado legislature repealed this statute would it arguably
be able to reassert legislative power to override procedural rules of court.
106. Pound III, supra note 83.
107. Id. at 601 (emphasis added). Dean Pound clearly concedes legislative power, and then
suggests a rule of prudence against the exercise of that power, out of deference to principles rooted
in the separation of powers doctrine. It is but a short step from that position to one which insists
that, as a matter of constitutional compulsion, the legislature has no such power. See infra text
accompanying notes 110-12.
108. Pound III, supra note 83, at 601.
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for the historical record precluded him from making the leap." Others,
less wedded to precedent, would later build on this theme and conclude
that any legislative activity in the regulation of procedure was unconstitutional. ,o
In the years immediately following the publication of the Pound articles, courts regularly rebuffed constitutional challenges to judicial rulemaking by relying on Pound-like arguments that the legislature could
delegate rule-making authority to the courts. "' More significantly, some
courts expanded Pound's arguments beyond the limits he set and held
unconstitutional, on separation of powers grounds, state statutes which
sought to regulate judicial procedure." 2
Roscoe Pound never took the position that the legislature could play
no role in the formulation of adjective law. Nonetheless, his historical
analysis, formulated to defend the need for judicial involvement in procedural reform against the contention that such involvement would invade
the legislative prerogative, spawned more expansive arguments in support
of the judicial role. Pound's defense of the right of the judiciary to act
pursuant to a legislative delegation of authority was easily turned into an
affirmative assertion of the inherent and exclusive prerogative of the court
to fashion procedural rules. It is in the midst of that development that
the New Mexico legislature and supreme court first faced the issue in the
1930's.
2. New Mexico Adopts the Pound Approach: The 1933 Act
In 1933, the New Mexico legislature adopted a statute which obviously
embodied the views of Roscoe Pound. '3 The statute explicitly authorized
109. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101. As an advocate for procedural reform, Dean
Pound also must have realized that extension of the argument to preclude legislative action would
lose his cause more support than it would gain.
110. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J.
635 (1935); Wigmore, Editorial Notes: All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void
L. Rev. 276 (1928).
Constitutionally, 23 Ill.
111. See, e.g., De Camp v. Central Ariz. Light & Power Co., 47 Ariz. 517, 57 P.2d 311 (1936);
Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931); Bryan v. State, 94 Fla. 909, 114 So. 773 (1927);
People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); Weibel v. Gardner, 45 S.D. 349, 187 N.W.
629 (1922); State v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1,267 P. 770 (1928).
112. See e.g., De Camp v. Central Ariz. Light & Power Co., 47 Ariz. 517, 57 P.2d 311 (1936)
(after legislation delegated rule-making power to court, subsequent statutes governing procedure
would be followed unless they "unreasonably limit ... the courts in the performance of the duties
imposed on them by the constitution"); Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931) (separation
of powers commits rule-making to judiciary and forbids other branches from exercise of that power).
113. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 147. Unfortunately, the legislative history
of the act has not been preserved, and there is no explicit link between the act and the Pound articles.
However, the structure of the act, and its similarity to the Colorado statute, "An Act Concerning
Practice and Procedure in Courts of Record," ch. 121, 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 447, praised by
Pound in one of his articles, Pound-Ili, supra note 83, at 176, suggest the influence of Dean Pound's
views.
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the supreme court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure
so long as they did not "abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights
of any litigant."' 4 Following Dean Pound's preferred approach, the statute constituted a total delegation of rule-making authority to the court.
The statute neither purported to create general statutory principles of
procedure which the court must honor nor to bind the court to legislativelyadopted procedure rules. Instead, the act provided that all existing procedural statutes "shall, from and after the passage of this Act, have force
and effect only as rules of court and shall remain in effect unless and
until modified or suspended by rules promulgated pursuant" to the stat115
ute.
The act embodied several fundamental principles. First, the statute was
predicated upon the assumption that it delegated to the judiciary a power
which the legislature perceived to be a legislative power. 116 Second, the
motivation of the legislature was convenience and efficiency rather than
a perception that constitutional doctrines were implicated.11 7 Third, the
statute categorically declared that the court could not use this delegated
rule-making authority to affect substantive rights. 8 Finally, by declaring
that existing procedural statutes could be overruled by judicially created
rules of court, the legislature transferred the ultimate rule-making authority to the courts. The court was authorized to write procedural rules
that contradicted and superseded legislative pronouncements." 9
The supreme court lost little time in exercising its expanded rulemaking authority. Almost immediately after passage of the 1933 statute,
the court declared all preexisting procedural statutes to be rules of court. 120
Shortly thereafter the court effected substantial changes in these statutes
by adopting a body of new court rules. 2 ' In bold face type preceding the
published rules, the court acknowledged that they were "[a]dopted by
114. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 148.
115. Id.
116. Id. It would be unnecessary and unavailing for the legislature to pass a statute granting
authority to the judiciary if the authority already existed in the judiciary.
117. Id. at 147. "The Supreme Court . . . shall ... regulate pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts of New Mexico, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy
determination of litigation upon its merits." Id. [Emphasis added].
118. Id.
119. Id. at 148. "All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure now existing, shall
from and after the passage of this Act, have force and effect only as rules of court and shall remain
in effect unless and until modified or suspended by rules promulgated pursuant hereto." Id.
Left unanswered by the statute was the question whether the legislature reserved the right to
overrule judicially-adopted rules of court by the passage of legislation contrary to a court rule adopted
pursuant to the statute. Nor did the legislation purport to preclude the legislature from repealing the
statute and thus reclaiming the rule-making authority.
120. See Rules of Court, 37 N.M. VI. The statute was approved on March 13, 1933, but did
not go into effect until June 19, 1933. 1933 N.M. Laws 84. The supreme court adopted the rule
transforming all "now existing statutes" relating to procedure into rules of court on April 13, 1933,
to take effect on the effective date of the new statute. 37 N.M. at VI.
121. See 1933-34 Rules, 38 N.M. VII. The new rules were effective on July 1, 1934. Id.
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''
the Supreme Court by authority of Chapter 84, Laws of 1933. 122 In its
per curiam order accompanying the rules, the court reiterated that it
adopted the rules under authority of the 1933 statute and referred to the
statute as having occasioned "[t]he 23recent enlargements of the rule-mak-

1
ing power" of the supreme court.

In Rule 2 the court adopted a numbering system for the rules which
paralleled the system used in the then extant procedure statute. Rule 2
declared that "[any rule bearing a number identical with that of a section
section. 124
of [the procedural statute] shall be deemed to supersede such
Adoption of this numbering system indicates that the court intended to
implement the rule-making power to the fullest extent authorized by the
statute.
In 1935, the supreme court promulgated a complete rewrite of the
appellate rules. 125 Again the court acknowledged that its authority to do
so was found in the 1933 statute. 126 The appellate rules also followed the
pattern of the 1933127 Act in adopting preexisting statutory procedural rules
as rules of court.

C. The Development of the Judicial Exclusivity Doctrine
The 1933 Act and the adoption of rules of procedure pursuant thereto
by the supreme court stand as admirable examples of legislative and
judicial cooperation. New Mexico's long tradition of shared responsibility
for rule-making set the stage for the adoption of Pound's view that rulemaking was more efficiently and effectively accomplished by the courts
than by the legislature.
Inevitably however, a litigant whose cause was harmed by the content
of the new rules would mount a challenge to them, thereby testing the
authority of the legislature to delegate so much authority to the judicial
branch. That challenge came in State v. Roy 12 1 in 1936. The decision in
Roy began the steady march toward the development of a new doctrine.
1. State v. Roy: The Roots of Modem Doctrine
Hyman Roy was convicted of the murder of Martha Hutchinson and
sentenced to die in the electric chair. 129 On appeal Roy alleged a host of
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 1933-34 Rules, R. 2, 38 N.M. at VIII.
125. Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, July 29, 1935, 39 N.M. VII.
126. Id. at VIII. In its per curiam introduction to the Rules, the Court identified "the recent
exposition of the power of the court" in the 1933 act as a reason for the 1935 amendments. Id. at
VII.
127. Id.
128. 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
129. Roy was executed after the affirmance of his conviction in this case.
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procedural errors normally associated with criminal appeals. 3 ' He also
challenged the constitutional validity of the criminal information under
which he was charged on grounds which questioned the validity of the
1933 Act and the rule-making power of the court.' 3' The court rejected
Roy's constitutional challenge and upheld the conviction and the sentence
of death. 32
' In so doing, the court laid the foundations of modem doctrine
concerning the rule-making power of the court.
The information under which Roy was charged was a "short form"
document authorized by the supreme court rules regulating criminal procedure, which had been promulgated pursuant to the 1933 Act.' 33 Roy
argued that the Act was an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative
power to determine judicial procedure.' 4 He contended, therefore, that
the rules of procedure adopted pursuant to the statute, including the "short
form" indictment authorized by the rules, were void. ' It is in this posture
that the conflict between legislative and judicial rule-making power was
first presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
In response, the attorney general made two arguments. First, he asserted
that the court's authority to write rules of procedure was not dependent
upon the 1933 Act because rule-making authority is an inherent power
of the judiciary.' 36 As a corollary to this argument, the attorney general
also asserted that this inherent judicial power to promulgate procedural
rules also was exclusive. ' In effect, the attorney general argued that the
doctrine of separation of powers not only assigned rule-making power to
the judicial branch but also forbade the legislative branch from sharing
in that power. 38
' Second, the attorney general asserted that, if the rulemaking authority was not the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the
courts, then it was a power, not exclusively legislative in nature, thus
39
allowing the conference of that power on the court by the 1933 Act. 1'
After an extensive examination of the state and federal authority on
130. Id. at 401-02, 60 P.2d at 648-49. Eight of the ten points on appeal related to alleged errors
involving the introduction of evidence, instructions to the jury, denial of a motion for continuance,
and the setting of the date of execution. Id.The supreme court gave rather short shrift to the six
traditional evidentiary and instruction-based challenges to the conviction, and focused on the constitutional challenge to the 1933 act "which we deem the most important." Id.at 417, 60 P.2d at
658.
131. Id. at 401, 60 P.2d at 648.
132. Id.at 403, 60 P.2d at 649.
133. Id.at 417, 60 P.2d at 658-59.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The argument tracks the language of article III, § 1, of the New Mexico Constitution,
which grants judicial power to the courts and then provides that no other branch of government
"shall exercise any powers properly belonging to [any other branch]." N.M. Const. art. III,
§ 1.
139. 40 N.M. at 417, 60 P.2d at 658-59.
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the subject,'" the court concluded that "the power to regulate procedure
is considered a judicial power, or at least that it is not considered to be
a purely or distinctively legislative power." 14 ' In effect, the court ruled
that the power to promulgate procedural rules is an inherent power of the
judiciary. As a result, the court rejected Roy's argument that the 1933
140. Id. at 418, 60 P.2d at 659-60. The court relied heavily on In re Constitutionality of Section
251.18, Wis. Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931), and State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber
Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928), for its analysis that procedural rule-making
might be neither exclusively legislative nor judicial. Id. Both are post-Pound cases, which rely
heavily on the logic of Dean Pound's analysis of judicial power.
Furthermore, the court relied on federal precedent, beginning with the famous dictum from Chief
Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825): "[tlhe courts, for
example may make rules .. . [and yet] [iut will not be contended, that these things might not be
done by the legislature, without the intervention of the Courts ...." Indeed, the Roy court echoed
the clearest expression of coordinate rule-making power, found in the Hampton Case, 276 U.S. 394
(1928), as reformulated in State ex rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 496,
220 N.W. 929, 938 (1928):
[T]here never was and never can be such a thing in the practical administration
of the law as a complete, absolute, scientific separation of the so-called coordinate governmental powers. As a matter of fact, they are and always have
been overlapping. Courts make rules of procedure which in many instances at
least might be prescribed by the Legislature.
Thus, while sowing the seeds for the development of a tradition of exclusive court authority for the
promulgation of procedural rules, Roy began with a healthy recognition of the overlapping nature
of legislative and judicial authority in this area. 40 N.M. at 418-19, 60 P.2d at 659.
It is this coordinate approach, recognized in Roy, but rejected in later New Mexico cases, which
typifies the federal model. Under current federal practice, rule-making is delegated by Congress to
the Supreme Court under appropriate Rules Enabling Acts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (rules
of civil procedure for the district courts); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1982) (rules of criminal procedure
for the district courts; 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982) (rules of evidence for the district courts).
Each of the federal delegations contemplates a "promulgate and wait" procedure, whereby the
Court, after promulgation, must report the rule's contents to Congress. The promulgated rule only
takes effect if Congress fails to take some contrary action within the prescribed period. These statutes
thus allow Congress to amend or to veto rules promulgated by the Court, see Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1941), although such a veto may only be accomplished by the enactment
of a statute, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983).
There has been much theoretical debate concerning whether rule-making power at the federal
level is inherently judicial or legislative. See, e.g., Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking
Procedures, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1976); Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme
Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 673 (1975). Congressional veto under the "promulgate and wait" procedure, however, was never invoked until action was taken on the controversial
proposed Rules of Evidence. See Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926
(1975). Congress had delayed implementation of the rules proposed by the Court to allow time for
consideration of a legislative draft. See Act of March 20, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9
(1973). Since then Congress has increased its oversight and amendatory role significantly. See, e.g.,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527
(1983) (amending proposed change in Fed. R. Evid. 4); Pub. L. No. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326 (1979)
(amending proposed changes in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
It is interesting to contemplate whether New Mexico would have been better off had the later
decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court paid more attention to the coordinate power line of
reasoning in Roy, rather than the inherent or exclusive judicial power ideas which were also given
expression in that case. Had the court followed the former rather than the latter, our system of
resolution of these questions might have mirrored the federal pattern.
141. 40 N.M. at 419, 60 P.2d at 659.
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Act was an unconstitutional delegation of exclusively-legislative power
to the courts.
The court was exercising an inherent judicial power when it wrote the
1934 rules, the court declared in Roy, thus obviating the non-delegation
problem. To reach this decision the court was obligated to disclaim its
prior statements that the Rules of 1934 and the Appellate Rules of 1936
were adopted under the authority of the 1933 Act. The court declared
that even though promulgated "subsequent to and consequent upon the
[1933 Act]," the 1934 rules "were promulgated nevertheless by this court
in the exercise of an inherent power lodged in us to prescribe such rules
of practice, pleading and procedure as will facilitate the administration
of justice."142
Even more significant than what it decided in Roy is what the court
avoided deciding. The court viewed as unnecessary a determination whether
the legislature "was ever rightfully in the rule-making field, or was a
mere trespasser or usurper."1 43 The court deemed it unnecessary to decide
whether the inherent judicial power to promulgate rules was an exclusive
power because "[t]here is no conflict at the present time between any
rule promulgated by this court with any law enacted by th e"
Thus, Roy established that procedural rule-making in New Mexico is
not exclusively legislative and that the courts have an independent, "inherent" power to prescribe rules of procedure. Beyond that holding, the
court chose not to venture. The difficult questions concerning the role of
the legislature, if any, were left for future consideration.
2. Tentative Steps Toward Resolution of the Issues Unanswered in
Roy
The inconsistent strains of the 1933 Act and Roy-shared legislative
and judicial responsibility for procedural rule-making on the one hand'45
and possibly exclusive judicial authority rooted in separation of powers
142. Id. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660.
143. Id. at 419, 60 P.2d at 660.
144. Id. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660. In an admirable exercise of judicial restraint the court avoided
ruling on that question because "[a] constitutional question, and one so controversial, should not
be determined in advance of necessity." Id.
The court also went on to reject Roy's contention that, even if the court had rule-making authority,
it had no authority to establish rules for the lower courts "inasmuch as such courts are constitutional
courts and can make their own rules." Id. The court rejected that contention by reference to the
constitutional provision granting the court appellate and superintending authority over the lower
courts. Id. See N.M. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 3. The court adopted the views of Dean Pound that such
constitutional provisions were nothing more than a codification of the common-law practice. In
England the'superior courts at Westminster had superintending rule-making authority over the lower
courts as a means of avoiding "a confusion in the methods of procedure and to provide uniform
rules of pleading and practice." 40 N.M. at 420-21, 60 P.2d at 661. See Pound II, supra note 83,
at 171.
145. The court developed the concept that procedural rule-making is a fit subject for coordinated
legislativ~e and judicial control in the portion of Roy which rebutted Roy's assertion that the 1933
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on the other 4 6-- continued unresolved for more than forty years. During
this time there was only intermittent reference to Roy. The few cases on
point "47
' sought to avoid direct confrontation. In only one case did the
act improperly delegated legislative power to the judiciary. 40 N.M. at 417-18, 60 P.2d at 658-59.
In explaining the overlapping power of the coordinate branches of government, the Roy court
described how courts often exercise administrative and executive powers, how legislative bodies are
often vested with judicial powers, and how executive officers must often interpret the very provisions
of law which they are obliged to carry out. Id. at 418-19, 60 P.2d at 659-60. The court concluded
that "[c]ourts make rules of procedure which in many instances at least might be prescribed by the
Legislature." Id. at 418, 60 P.2d at 659.
146. The Roy court's holding that it had inherent power to enact the rules governing procedure
is arguably rooted in the court's conclusion, "[t]hat the power to provide rules of pleading, practice
and procedure . . . is lodged in this court by the Constitution of New Mexico." Id. at 422, 60 P.2d
at 662. However, this portion of the opinion involved the constitutional power of superintending
control rooted in article VI, § 3, rather than the separation of powers provision in article III, § 1.
Id. The court was addressing the source of the supreme court's supervisory power over the lower
courts, rather than determining whether the constitution authorized the legislature, the courts, or
both branches to develop procedural rules. Id.
147. Three years after Roy, the court decided the first of several cases which related to rulemaking power. In City of Roswell v. Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d 701 (1939), the court dealt with
a statute which called for the dismissal with prejudice of cases which had been pending for over
two years without any action to bring them to final termination. Id. at 2, 96 P.2d at 701. The court
declined to decide the case on the basis of whether the legislature could exercise rule-making power.
See id. Instead, the court resolved the issue by reliance on N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34, which provides
that "No act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules
of evidence or procedure, in any pending case." Id.
The Holmes court characterized the statute as altering the inherent common law power of courts
to dismiss by setting a specific time limit applicable to dismissals for want of prosecution and
providing for dismissal with prejudice. 44 N.M. at 3, 96 P.2d at 701-02. The court then reversed
the lower court's order of dismissal because "the case here was a pending case at the effective date
of [the statute] . . . and no change in procedure can be permitted therein because of . . . [art. IV,

§34]." 44 N.M. at 6, 96 P.2d at 704. In the process, the court acknowledged the separation of
powers problem by reserving the question "[w]hether the Act, operating prospectively only is subject
to other constitutional objections, when invoked in a proper case." Id. at 5, 96 P.2d at 703.
In a subsequent case involving a denial of a dismissal for want of prosecution, the court again
recognized the separation of powers problem. In that case, Sitta v. Zinn, 77 N.M. 146, 420 P.2d
131 (1966), the defendant filed a motion for dismissal after the two-year period provided by court
rule, but before expiration of the newly amended statutory three year period. Id. at 147, 420 P.2d
at 132. Again, relying on article IV, § 34, the court refused to apply the statute which had been
passed while the case was pending. See id. at 147, 420 P.2d at 132-33. But in so doing the court
"recognize[d] as present certain questions relative to the power of the legislature to enact the change
in view of Art. III, § 1, of the New Mexico Constitution, providing for separation of powers.
Id. at 148, 420 P.2d at 133.
Although Holmes and Sirra suggest that article IV, § 34, is an implied constitutional recognition
of the legislative power to adopt "rules of evidence or procedure," Southwest Underwriters v.
Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 109, 452 P.2d 176, 178 (1969), expressly rejected the argument, noting
that Article III, § 1, which establishes separation of powers, forbids one department of government
from exercising any power belonging to either of the others, except as "expressly directed or
permitted" by the constitution. Id. (Emphasis added.) The court read this phrase as forbidding "a
construction of the Constitution which would authorize the exercise of such a power by implied
authority." Id.
The Montoya court's treatment of article IV, § 34 is cursory and perhaps erroneous. First, although
legislative rule-making may not be "expressly directed" by article IV, § 34, the power may be
"expressly permitted" by that provision. In addition, the court's rejection of the article IV, § 34
argument treats rule-making as if it must be all legislative or all judicial in nature, thereby ignoring
the important teaching of Roy on the overlapping nature of many governmental powers.
For a discussion of the main holding of Montoya, see infra text accompanying notes 165-75.
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court find it necessary to declare a procedural statute invalid, and then
under circumstances which avoided any real clash with the legislature.' 4 8
Nonetheless, these post-Roy cases laid the groundwork for the assertion
of judicial rule-making supremacy in the mid-1970's.
The court's initial consideration of the impact of Roy added nothing
to the development of the law. A 1947 case, State v. Arnold,'49 involved
an appeal by the state from an adverse judgment in a civil action brought
by the state against Arnold. The state filed an appeal after the expiration
of the three-month period prescribed in a court rule for bringing appeals
but within the six-month period allowed under a state statute for the
bringing of appeals.
The supreme court upheld the validity of the court rule reducing the
time for appeal from six to three months. The court merely labelled the
issue as procedural"5 and concluded that, "whatever the source" of power,
Roy established that the judiciary "possesses unquestioned power to make
rules touching pleading, practice and procedure. "' '
The court declined to address the issue of whether the statute was void
as a legislative intrusion on the exclusive power of the court to write
procedural rules. Nor did the court consider whether it had modified the
statute pursuant to the terms of the 1933 Act or by virtue of an inherent
judicial power to override otherwise valid procedural statutes to which
the supreme court no longer acquiesces. Though the reasoning is incomplete, the implications of the decision are clear. The court determined
that statutes affecting procedure do not survive the adoption of conflicting
judicial rules. The court thereby set the stage for a future ruling that the
legislature has no power to write procedural statutes.
When the issue was next presented in 1957 in State ex rel. Bliss v.
Greenwood, 152 the court took a reasoned and balanced approach. In Bliss
the trial court denied the defendant's demand for a jury trial prior to the
imposition of contempt for violation of a court order.'53 On appeal, the
148. State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957) (statute creating right
to jury trial in contempt proceedings held invalid as a violation of separation of powers provision
of Organic Act, even though statute had been repealed previously). See infra text accompanying
notes 152-64.
149. 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947).
150. Id. at 313, 183 P.2d at 846. The state argued that the setting of the time for the taking an
appeal is substantive. Id. at 313, 183 P.2d at 845. The court, relying on authority from Colorado,
Ernest v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 213 P. 994 (1923), however, concluded that, while the decision
whether to allow an appeal is indeed substantive, "reasonable regulations affecting the time and
manner of taking and perfecting the same are procedural and within this court's rule making power."
51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47.
151. 51 N.M. at 313, 183 P.2d at 846.
152. 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
153. Id. at 158, 315 P.2d at 224. The lower court found Greenwood guilty of contempt for
irrigating his farm from wells without a valid water right and without a permit, in violation of a
permanent injunction prohibiting him from using the water. Id. The injunction had issued because
Greenwood had drilled the wells without a permit from the state engineer. Id. Greenwood was fined
$750 and given a six month suspended jail sentence. Id. at 158, 315 P.2d at 224-25.
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defendant invoked a territorial law which precluded the imposition of a
'
fine for contempt of court in excess of fifty dollars without a jury trial. 54
The court determined that the territorial law limiting contempt power
in the absence of a jury was void because it violated the separation of
powers provisions of the Organic Act which established the territory.' 55
The court began its analysis with the assertions that the power to punish
for contempt is "inherent in the courts" and that its exercise is "the
highest form of judicial power." 56 The court conceded, however, that
judicial power in this area "is not absolute, exclusive and free of all
legislative regulation."' 5 7 Rather, the court concluded, reasonable legislative regulation, even of subjects within the inherent power of courts,
was permissible, so long as the legislation "preserve[d] to the court
sufficient power to protect itself from indignities and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial functions.""'
Applying this framework of analysis, the court found that a statute
requiring jury trials in cases involving indirect contempt "[did] not materially interfere with the power of the courts.""' The court determined,
however, that the necessity for summary procedure is greater in direct
contempts-where the contempt occurs in the presence of the court154. Id. at 160-61, 315 P.2d at 226. "No judge of the district court shall fine any person for
contempt or want of respect for the court, in any sum exceeding fifty dollars, without a jury trial."
§ 1039 of the 1897 Code, C.L. 1865, Ch. 28, § 2.
The legislature had repealed the statute by the time the court decided Greenwood, 63 N.M. at
161, 315 P.2d at 226. Greenwood claimed that repeal of the statute after statehood did not negate
his right to jury trial because the New Mexico constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury as
it existed at the time the Constitution was adopted. Id. The court noted that article II, § 12 of the
New Mexico Constitution provides: "The right of trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be
" 63 N.M. at 166, 315 P.2d at 226. The terms "as it has
secured to all and remain inviolate ..
heretofore existed" had previously been interpreted as referring to the right to jury trial as it existed
immediately preceding statehood. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Gober, 43 N.M. 146, 87 P.2d 437 (1939).
The supreme court agreed that if article 11, § 12 was valid initially, its subsequent repeal after
statehood could not have the effect of denying Greenwood the right to a jury trial. 63 N.M. at 161,
315 P.2d at 226.
155. 63 N.M. at 161, 315 P.2d at 227. Separation of powers is implied in the Organic Act's
establishment of three branches of territorial government. See supra, note 28.
156. 63 N.M. at 161, 315 P.2d at 227.
157. Id. at 162, 315 P.2d at 227. The court relied in part for this conclusion on its holding in
Exparte Magee, 31 N.M. 276, 242 P. 332 (1925). In Magee, the court had upheld a gubernatorial
pardon of a judicially-imposed sentence for contempt against a separation of powers challenge. Id.
at 282, 242 P. at 334. The court reviewed the history of the pardon power and found that it had
extended to criminal contempt "from early times in the English law." Id. Furthermore, the Magee
court concluded that the three branches of government are only "relatively" independent of each
other and that the pardoning power of the governor is but one example of the "system of checks
and balances whereby justice is secured to the people, and public affairs are wisely administered."
Id. at 279, 242 P.2d at 333.
158. 63 N.M. at 162, 315 P.2d at 227.
159. Id. The court acknowledged that a substantial body of authority had struck similar statutes
as encroachments on the power of the judiciary. Id. Nonetheless, it suggested that where the legislature
imposes restraints on the imposition of indirect contempt-that committed outside the presence of
the court-less intrusion into the essential powers of the judiciary occurred than if the legislature
imposed procedural constraint on the judicial power to punish direct contempts--those occurring in
the presence of the court. Id.
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because "[s]ummary measures may be the only effective means of defending the dignity of judicial tribunals and of ensuring that they are able
to accomplish the purpose of their existence. "'° The court concluded
that, because the territorial law applied to both direct and indirect contempts, the law was so intrusive on the judiciary's power to fulfill its
functions that it was not within the proper limits of legislative regulation.
The court held the statute invalid as violative of the Organic Act's requirement of separation of powers.161
The significance of Bliss extends beyond the holding that the legislature
may not interfere with the power of the courts to punish for direct contempt
of court. Bliss explicitly recognized that the legislature has a legitimate
role to play in regulating procedure. It also established that the courts
may overrule statutes establishing procedural rules under certain circumstances. "[W]hile the legislature may provide rules of procedure which
are reasonable regulations of the contempt power it may not .. .by
enacting procedural rules . . . substantially impair or destroy the implied
power of the court to punish for contempt. "162
Bliss thus represents the first principled attempt to deal with the questions left unanswered in Roy. The court recognized that, even with respect
to matters involving "the highest form of judicial power," separation of
powers is not absolute. Bliss articulated a "practical standard," mandating
the nullification of legislative acts affecting inherently judicial matters
only when those acts encroach upon court power "to protect itself from
indignities and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial functions.""' Implicit inthis standard is the recognition that both the legislature and the judiciary share rule-making power. The court comprehended
that the doctrine of separation of powers should be invoked to invalidate
legislative acts only where procedural statutes unreasonably encroach on
the essential ability of the courts to function effectively as an independent
branch of government."
In Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya,'65 decided twelve years after
Bliss, the court ignored the careful balance struck in Bliss and came very
close to an express holding that the rule-making power is exclusively a
judicial power. In Montoya, the defendant had moved for a Rule 41(e)
dismissal for want of prosecution for two years, as authorized by the
then-existing rule."6 The trial court denied the motion on the ground that
160. Id. at 163, 315 P.2d at 227:
161. Id. Though the court declared the statute to be unconstitutional, there was no direct clash
with the legislature, because the legislature had already repealed the statute. See supra, note 154.
162. Id. at 162, 315 P.2d at 227.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969).
166. N.M. R. Civ. P.41(e) (effective Sept. 20, 1942).
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enacted statute had extended the required time to three
a subsequently
167
years.
The supreme court reversed. The court conceded that "[i]f the legislature has the right to pass laws regulating pleading, practice and procedure in the courts, then the motion to dismiss . . . was premature.9168
The opinion acknowledged that the post-Roy cases did not "squarely
resolve the specific issue now presented" 1 69 but asserted that those cases
"have clearly pointed the way to a resolution of the question."'' 70 The
court then concluded that the three-year statute "purports to direct a
change of procedure which infringes on the court's exercise of its constitutional duties."lT7
The apparent rationale of Montoya is that the doctrine of separation of
powers precludes the legislature from taking any action to promulgate
rules which are clearly procedural. 1 72 However, more limited readings of
the decision are possible. First, the court may have held merely that the
legislature cannot adopt a procedural statute which is in conflict with an
existing rule of court. 1 73 Alternatively, the court may have authorized
limited legislative rule-making so long as the legislation does not touch
upon "those rules of pleading, practice and procedure which are essential
to the performance of the constitutional duties imposed upon the courts. ",74
Because Montoya can be narrowly interpreted, and because the court
failed to cite or to discuss either Bliss 75 or the long range impact of the
decision, the opinion is merely a harbinger of decisions to come, rather
than the leading New Mexico precedent establishing the exclusive nature
of the inherent power of the judiciary to promulgate rules of procedure.
167. Act of Mar. 19, 1965, 1965 N.M. Laws 132. The statute extended the required period of
inaction to three years and exempted cases which were to be tried by jury. After the filing of the
underlying case at issue in this action, but before the motion to dismiss was filed, the supreme court
amended Rule 4 1(e) to extend the period of inaction to three years in all cases, including jury cases.
The amended rule only applied, however, to cases filed on or after July 1, 1967. Thus, the conflict
in Montoya was between the court's two-year rule and the legislature's subsequently adopted threeyear statute. 80 N.M. at 107, 452 P.2d at 176.
168. 80 N.M. at 107-08, 452 P.2d at 176-77.
169. Id. at 108, 452 P.2d at 177. The court properly cited Roy, City of Roswell, and Arnold as
authority for the inherent power of the court to prescribe rules of practice, and the court acknowledged
that Sitta did not directly present the question of legislative power to enact changes in procedural
rules. Id. at 108, 452 P.2d at 177.
170. Id. at 108, 452 P.2d at 177.
171. Id. at 110, 452 P.2d at 179.
172. Id. at 109, 452 P.2d at 178. The court conceded that with regard to issues that straddle the
fine line between substance and procedure "legislative enactments with respect thereto would be
proper." Id.
173. Id. The supreme court was careful to note that this case involved a statute and rule of court
that were in direct conflict. Id. Moreover, the statute was adopted after the court had promulgated
the rule in question. See supra notes 166-167.
174. Id. at 109, 452 P.2d at 178.
175. Neither party cited Bliss in the briefs submitted to the court in Montoya. Records of the
Case. University of New Mexico School of Law Library.
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Four years after Montoya was decided, the supreme court took a more
conciliatory approach in determining the proper legislative role in rulemaking. In Alexander v. Delgado,'76 the court was presented with the
question whether the court of appeals had the power to overrule supreme
court precedent. The supreme court held that the court of appeals lacked
such power.177 In its decision, the court relied in part upon a statute
regulating the certiorari process. 178 The court conceded that its certiorari
power flows directly from the New Mexico Constitution'7 9 but refused to
find that the statute was therefore an invalid infringement on judicial
power: "This court has no quarrel with the statutory arrangements which
seem reasonable and workable and has not seen fit to change it by rule. "'80
This significant declaration incorporates four important principles. First,
it acknowledges that statutes affecting procedure are not automatically
void and that the legislature has some legitimate role in the rule-making
process. Second, it is a tacit judicial recognition of the principle contained
in the 1933 Act-that procedural statutes are to be deemed valid rules of
court until altered by the court's exercise of rule-making authority.' 8'
Third, it demonstrates that, in the absence of conflicting court rules, the
court will follow the dictates of procedural statutes which it deems "reasonable and workable." Fourth, the court reserves the power to amend
or to revoke legislatively-created rules which are not "reasonable and
workable."
As this historical review illustrates, the supreme court never waivered
from its view that the court had an inherent power to promulgate rules
of procedure during the period from 1936 to 1973. The court demonstrated
less certainty concerning the role of the legislature. In Montoya, the court
flirted with the view that the doctrine of separation of powers barred any
participation by the legislature. Bliss and Alexander, however, illustrate
a more conciliatory approach. They indicate that a statute affecting procedure is not necessarily void. A procedural statute not in conflict with
a court rule can stand as long as it does not compromise the essential
integrity and independence of the courts'82 or prove unreasonable or un176. 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973).
177. Id. at 718, 507 P.2d at 778. On an appeal from a defense verdict in an automobile-pedestrian
accident case, the court of appeals had refused to follow an applicable Uniform Jury Instruction on
unavoidable accident, and sought to abolish the common law doctrine. Id. The supreme court granted
certiorari and affirmed the conclusion of the court of appeals, but held that it was for the supreme
court, and not the court of appeals, to alter supreme court precedent. Id. at 719, 507 P.2d at 780.
178. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-5-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). In the words of the Alexander court:
"Implicit in the statute is the concept that the Court of Appeals is to be governed by the precedent
of this Court." 84 N.M. at 718, 507 P.2d at 779.
179. 84 N.M. at 718, 507 P.2d at 779.
180. Id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
182. State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (1957).
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' A procedural statute in conflict with a court rule,
workable in practice. 83
however, must fall either for constitutional reasons 184 or as a result of the
1933 Act."8 5
The supreme court opinions during this period were ambivalent, if not
contradictory. While the court was finally poised to determine the issue,
the decision was not preordained by the legal precedents developed by
the supreme court during forty years subsequent to Roy.
3. McBride and Ammerman: The Exclusivity Doctrine Fully
Developed
The doctrine of exclusive judicial rule-making power, rooted in separation of powers, was developed in two cases decided in the mid-1970's.
In State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride186 and Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 8 7 the court finally resolved the question left unanswered
in Roy and subsequent decisions interpreting Roy. Both cases declared
that whenever there is a conflict between a statute and a court rule which
seek to control a matter of practice or procedure, separation of powers
requires that the rule be given effect over the conflicting statute. These
cases seem to reject the concept of coordinate legislative and judicial
rule-making power. Instead, they declare that, as a matter of constitutional
compulsion, the judiciary possesses exclusive power to control all matters
governing practice and procedure. A careful reading of the cases and
subsequent decisions applying them suggests, however, that the supreme
court intended not to exclude the legislature from the rule-making process
but only intended to assure judicial supremacy in any clash between
legislative and judicial rules of procedure.
McBride involved a constitutional challenge to the appointment of the
respondent as a district court judge. The attorney general, seeking McBride's
ouster, filed a quo warranto action"88 as an original action in the supreme
court. The attorney general argued that the state constitution prohibited
183. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973).
184. See Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 110, 452 P.2d 176, 179 (1969).
185. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, 1933 N.M. Laws 84. It is, of course, less intrusive for the court to
rely upon the provisions of the 1933 act in giving effect to a court rule over the provisions of a
procedural statute. Unlike the separation of powers route, reliance on the 1933 act does not challenge
the constitutional authority of the legislature. On the contrary, the Act recognizes the joint power
of both branches and expresses a legislative judgment that, on matters of court procedure, the courts
may be better able to fashion appropriate rules.
186. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
187. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
188. 88 N.M. at 254, 539 P.2d at 1016. Quo warranto is the traditional method of challenging
the right of an office holder to his office. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§44-3-4 to -6 (1978). Because of
its historic roots among the extraordinary writs of the early common law, quo warranto is still bound
up with many unusual rules of pleading, even in its modem statutory form. See, e.g., Huning v.
Los Chavez Zoning Comm'n, 93 N.M. 655, 604 P.2d 121 (1979) (private party may not bring
action unless failure to act by attorney general or district attorney is shown).
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the appointment of McBride, a member of the legislature, to a civil office
within a year after which the legislature increased the salary for that
office. 1 9
The rule-making power question arose only as part of the majority's
answer to the dissenting view that the court should dismiss the case for
want of jurisdiction. Chief Justice McManus, in dissent, began with the
premise that because quo warranto "is strictly statutory,"" and because
an allegation required by statute was missing-i.e., "the name of the
person rightfully entitled to the office with a statement of his right
thereto"1 9 1-the petition was fatally defective and required dismissal.
In response, the majority acknowledged the statutory requirements for
quo warranto, but disagreed with the dissent's assertion that the writ was
purely statutory. The court found specific constitutional authority for
supreme court jurisdiction in quo warranto,92
' independent of the statute.
The court went on to determine that "the statutory provision requiring
the name of the person rightfully entitled to the office is clearly procedural."' 93 Finding inherent power to regulate procedural matters in the
separation of powers'9 4 and superintending control'9 5 provisions of the
constitution, the court boldly asserted the exclusivity of this judicial rulemaking power. 1" "Under the Constitution, the legislaturelacks the power
189. 88 N.M. at 247-48, 539 P.2d at 1009-10. There was some confusion over whether McBride
was serving as a senator at the time the judicial pay bill was passed because of a reapportionment
decision which altered districts and terms of office. See id. The main argument on the merits,
however, focused on whether the constitutional prohibition applied to judicial offices. See id. at 24950, 539 P.2d at 1011-12. The court found against McBride on the merits and issued the requested
Order of Ouster. Id. at 252, 539 P.2d at 1014.
190. Id. at 254, 539 P.2d at 1016 (McManus, C.J., dissenting). The chief justice ignored the
constitutional provision confirming quo warranto jurisdiction in the supreme court, N.M. Const. art.
VI, § 3, and made no mention of the court rule governing original writs under that authority. See
N.M. R. App. P. (Civ.) 12.
191. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 44-3-6 (1978). The attorney general did not name "the person rightfully
entitled to the office," because there was none. Indeed, whenever a gubernatorial appointee for any
office is subject to challenge, by definition (and until a subsequent appointment by the governor),
there is no person "rightfully entitled to the office." Thus, if quo warranto is the exclusive method
of determining a legal title to an office, see Conklin v. Cunningham, 7 N.M. 445, 38 P. 170 (1894),
adoption of the Chief Justice's procedural argument would have immunized all gubernatorial appointees from article IV, § 28 attack.
192. "The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto ... against all state
officers.
... N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3.
193. 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008. In subsequent quo warranto cases the court has ignored
this aspect of the decision and has rigorously enforced the legislatively imposed pleading requirements
of the quo warranto statute. See, e.g., Huning v. Los Chavez Zoning Comm'n, 93 N.M. 655, 657,
604 P.2d 121, 123 (1979) ("Since the statutory requirement for quo warranto has not been met in
this respect, there is no authority in the plaintiffs to file this application in quo warranto.")
194. N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.
195. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3.
196. The court concluded correctly that existing precedent demonstrated that the supreme court
has "the inherent power to regulate all pleading, practice and procedure affecting the judicial branch
of government." 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008. In support of this assertion, the court cited
several cases including Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973); Sitta v. Zinn,
77 N.M. 146, 420 P.2d 131 (1966); City of Roswell v. Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d 701 (1939);
and State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936).
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to prescribe by statute rules of practice and procedure, although it has in
the past attempted to do so .. .for the constitutional power is vested
exclusively in this court."197
This unequivocal language suggests that the supreme court in McBride
intended to bar the legislature completely from the rule-making process.
The full opinion, however, contains language suggesting a less dramatic
result. Immediately after asserting that the legislature lacked all rulemaking power, the court qualified its statement by adding that "statutes
purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts cannot be made
binding." 19 8 This language suggests that legislative rule-making may be
appropriate, but will not survive a judicial rule to the contrary. This
reading is buttressed by the court's analysis of the specific problem presented in McBride. In McBride, the court noted that "the statute requiring
the name of the legitimate officeholder be contained in the petitions is
inconsistent with Rule 12(a) of the Rules Governing Appeals."' The
McBride court then quoted with approval from its recent decision in
Alexander v. Delgado: "This court has no quarrel with the statutory
arrangements which seem reasonable and workable and has not seen fit
to change ... by rule. '' 2 ' Hence, the court suggested that legislative
rule-making is not void, but merely voidable-that the legislature may,
by statute, promulgate judicial rules which will be applicable unless and
until the supreme court adopts a rule of court to the contrary. Under this
reading, the statutory requirement was not void because it dealt with
procedure but because it conflicted with a rule of court addressing the
same procedural issue.
McBride represents, therefore, not the unequivocal banishment of the
legislature from the rule-making sphere, but a continuation of judicial
ambivalence on the question. The broad language asserting that the legislature has no rule-making power is moderated by other statements suggesting that the legislature has a valid role but must defer to the court's
rule-making authority when there is a conflict.
In Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,Inc. 20 1 decided in 1976, the
court again broadly asserted that the power to make procedural rules for
the courts was vested exclusively with the court. Again, however, the
opinion could be read more narrowly to posit that legislative rule-making
may be valid but must fall to a contrary rule of the court.
Ammerman involved the validity of an evidentiary privilege for news197. 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008 (emphasis added).
198. Id.
199. Id. The rule of court provides that all prerogative writs be accompanied by a verified petition
and sets forth what allegations the petition must contain. The rule does not require that the name
of the person entitled to the office be contained in the petition. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-12-12(a) (1974
Interim Supp.).
200. 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008 (quoting Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507
P.2d 778, 779 (1973)).
201. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
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men adopted by the legislature," 2 including the statutorily-provided mode
of de novo appeal to the supreme court of questions involving the assertion
of that privilege.2" 3 The plaintiffs brought slander actions against media
defendants2 4 and sought disclosure of information from the individual
defendants concerning their sources. Defendants asserted the privilege
provided by the statute, but the district court ordered them to disclose
the information sought. The defendants appealed. The appeal presented
two constitutional challenges to the statute: (1) whether the statutory
newsman's privilege was invalid as a legislative encroachment on the
rule-making power of the court; and (2) whether the appellate procedure
set by statute for reviewing determinations of the applicability of the
privilege was also violative of separation of powers. 205
The court first addressed the validity of the statutory privilege. The
court examined whether the privilege was procedural or substantive in
nature. Finding that rules of privilege, as exceptions to the general duty
of all citizens to furnish evidence, are universally considered rules of
evidence, 20 6 the court went on to find that rules of evidence, "by reason
of the function they serve in the judicial process, are very largely, if not
entirely, procedural. " 207
The court then explicitly framed the crucial question: "[W]hether rules
of procedure in judicial proceedings are matters for this court to fashion
202. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975) (now codified as amended at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 38-6-7 (Cum. Supp. 1984)). The statute provided a broad newsman's privilege which was applicable
"before any proceeding or authority," N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (A) (Supp. 1975), unless a district
court determined in a written order containing a statement of reasons, that "disclosure is essential
to prevent injustice." Id. at § 20-1-12. 1(C).
203. The statute also provided for interlocutory appeal from such disclosure orders, together with
short time-frames for the docketing and hearing of such appeals. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12. 1(C)
(Supp. 1975).
204. The appeal in Ammerman involved the consolidation of five cases involving the same issues
concerning the constitutionality of the newsman's privilege statute. 89 N.M. at 308, 551 P.2d at
1355.
205. Initially, only the issue of the validity of the statutory provisions governing appeal was
presented for review by way of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal. Id. at 309, 551 P.2d at
1356. At the court's request, the constitutionality of the statutory privilege itself was also presented
to the court. Id.
Had the court merely ruled the procedure unconstitutional, it would have left the lower courts to
grapple with the constitutional question of the validity of the privilege itself while leaving no
mandatory expeditious route for the appeal of that important question. As a result, consideration of
the validity of the statutory privilege was warranted out of due regard for the question's importance
and the efficient administration of justice.
206. "[R]ules of evidence are procedural, in that they are a part of the judicial machinery
administered by the courts for determining the facts upon which the substantive rights of the litigant
rest and are resolved . . . all rules of evidence (including rules of presumption and privilege) . . .
are traditionally considered to be 'adjective law' or 'procedural law."' 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at
1357.
207. Id. The court recognized that "the line between substance and procedure is often elusive
and that authorities, in endeavoring to follow this dichotomy in the rule-making process, are not
always in accord." Id. Unfortunately, the court then went on to consider the question wholesale,
looking only at rules of evidence in general, to determine that rules of evidence are procedural by
reason of their function in the judicial process. Then, in an unwarranted leap, the court found that
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and adopt, or matters for the Legislature to adopt, or matters which may
properly be adopted by either or both the Legislature and this court. "20
The court acknowledged that in Roy it had declined to hold that judicial
power in this area was exclusive 2" and that Arnold merely held that a
court rule could and did modify a procedural statute.2"0 Relying on language in McBride, however, the court reaffirmed that "under our Constitution the Legislature lacks power to prescribe by statute rules of evidence
and procedure, this constitutionalpower is vested exclusively in this court,
and statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts
cannot be binding ... .
The court then declared that the legislature had invaded the exclusive
province of the court by seeking to regulate a matter of pleading, practice,
2 2
or procedure. The court, therefore, held that the statute was invalid. "
The court then turned to the second issue and struck two provisions
of the statute which dealt with appellate review of the trial court ruling
concerning the existence of the privilege. The court held that the portion
the mere fact that the supreme court adopted the New Mexico Rules of Evidence conclusively
determined that all rules of evidence are procedural. Id.
The court ignored the body of well-reasoned authority which supports the proposition that privileges, as distinguished from most rules of evidence, "are intended to serve substantive results
extrinsic to the litigation." J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 2 Weinstein's Evidence 501-13 (1982). As
explained by the most eminent authority on the subject: "The New Mexico Supreme Court has taken
what most students of procedure would consider a high-handed attitude of denigrating legislative
competence in this field. Its position that privileges are strictly procedural rather than substantive
and thus not amenable to legislative action is in the extreme minority." Id. See also Weinstein, supra
note 140, at 925-26.
The supreme court's willingness to lump privileges with other rules of evidence is understandable.
If privilege rules are substantive, then the legislature and not the court, would have the final say in
determining rules of privileges, because substantive law determinations of the judiciary are always
subject to legislative override. See, e.g., Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 683, 634 P.2d 1234, 1235
(1981) (after announcing judicial decision adopting comparative negligence, court noted that "the
legislature is now in session and may wish to address the issue").
208. 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357.
209. Id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358. Indeed, Roy had acknowledged that many subjects were neither
exclusively legislative or judicial and that separation of powers was not necessarily a doctrine of
absolutes. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44. Rather than emphasizing that aspect of Roy,
however, the Ammerman court emphasized the exclusivity portions of Roy, which were articulated
in the context of the court's constitutional power of superintending control, rather than separation
of powers. Id. The superintending control issues raised in Roy under article VI, § 3, related more
to the issue of the power of the supreme court juxtaposed against the inherent powers of the lower
courts. See supra note 146.
Separation of powers and the power of superintending control are distinct constitutional provisions
which serve to protect different interests. Despite this, the court has consistently read them together
as the joint basis for its exclusive power over procedural rule-making at least since McBride.
210. In fact, Arnold had merely applied the rule and ignored the statute, once the court had
determined that the rule fell within the court's "inherent" rule-making power. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
211. 89 N.M. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359 (emphasis added).
212. Id. Given the separation of powers ground for its ruling, the court was careful to declare
only that the statute "cannot be relied upon or enforced in judicial proceedings" and expressly left
open the possibility that the substance of the statute validly may be invoked in legislative and
administrative proceedings. Id. (emphasis added).
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of the statute which required that the court hear the appeal de novo213
was inconsistent with existing appellate rules of procedure, which the
court had previously construed as requiring deference to the fact finding
of the trial court.214 The court also struck the twenty-day time limit for
the hearing of the appeal as an unconstitutional legislative incursion into
a procedural matter.2" 5 The court sought to bolster its constitutional argument with a bit of hyperbole, expressing the concern that "[i]t would
be utterly impossible for this court to live up to its responsibilities . ..
if the Legislature could . . . fix time limitations within which this court
must act." 216
Just as it did in McBride, however, the supreme court in Ammerman
combined sweeping rhetoric asserting that the legislature lacked the power
to write procedural rules with a narrow rationale that legislative pronouncements concerning procedure were valid but could be superseded
by a contrary rule of court. The court noted that the newsman's privilege
statute contradicted the Rules of Evidence promulgated by the court.2" 7
New Mexico Rule of Evidence 501 expressly provides that the only
privileges applicable in judicial proceedings are those "otherwise required
by constitution [and those] provided in these rules or in other rules adopted
by the supreme court."2"8 The court then characterized the issue as one,
like the one faced in McBride, in which the court was "again confronted
with a conflict between a statute and a rule of this court."'2 The court
quoted approvingly the broad language of McBride which asserted exclusive judicial authority but also declared that "[clertainly statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the Court cannot be,made
213. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12. 1(C) (Supp. 1975) (now codified as amended at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§38-6-7(C) (Cum. Supp. 1984)). The court might have hinged this ruling on the fact that an appeal
"de novo" is, in effect, the invocation of the court's original jurisdiction, and the legislature has
no power to expand that jurisdiction beyond the limits provided in the constitution. See In re Motion
for a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 94 N.M. 1, 606 P.2d 539 (1980) (invalidating provision of Organized
Crime Act requiring order of supreme court for issuance of subpoena to Governor's Organized Crime
Prevention Commission). See also In re Arnall's Guardianship, 94 N.M. 306, 610 P.2d 193 (1980).
214. 88 N.M. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359. See New Mexico State Highway Dep't v. Bible, 38
N.M. 372, 34 P.2d 295 (1934) ("appeal" involves review of proceedings at trial, not a new trial).
215. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 313, 551 P.2d at 1360.
216. Id. This assertion overstates the case because the 20-day limit is merely expressive of a
legislative policy that such privilege questions are important and ought be advanced on the docket
for expeditious resolution. Furthermore, the statute does not encroach on the deliberative processes
of the court by seeking to require a decision in 20 days; it only requires that the hearing be held
within 20 days. Finally, it is no more intrusive on the judiciary than the host of federal statutes
which require expedition through advancement on the docket of certain substantive matters which
Congress deems especially important. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(2) (1982) ("hearing shall be
given precedence and held at the earliest practicable date"). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1982)
(appeal of confined recalcitrant grand jury witness "shall be disposed of as soon as practicable, but
not later than thirty days from the filing of such appeal").
217. 89 N.M. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358.
218. N.M. R. Evid. 501.
219. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358.
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Ammerman thus may be read as decreeing only that legis-

lative enactments concerning procedure are valid until the supreme court
has exercised its inherent and superseding power to revoke or to amend
the statutory provision. 22'
Despite these undertones of shared responsibility for rule-making with
the judiciary making the final determination when a statute and a rule
conflict,222 McBride and Ammerman represent the outer limit of development of the doctrine of exclusive judicial power to fashion rules of
practice and procedure. To the extent that they reflect the court's view
that the legislature is impotent to participate to any degree in rule-making,
the decisions are weakened by four common failings. First, they oversimplify the often intractable task of drawing a bright line between matters
of substance and procedure.223 Second, they ignore the sound teachings
220. Id. (emphasis added) (citing State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d
1006, 1008 (1975)).
221. The de novo hearing issue was also resolved on the basis of the superiority of a contrary
rule of court. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
Apparently, the court found no judicial rule which contradicted the 20-day hearing requirement.
This provision was struck on the basis that to permit the legislature to promulgate such a rule would
make it "utterly impossible for this court to live up to its responsibilities." Id. at 313, 551 P.2d at
1360. Despite the absence of a contrary rule of court, this holding need not have been premised on
the exclusive judicial power language used in the opinion. Judicial supremacy could be premised
here on the power of the court to override specific procedural statutes when necessary "to protect
itself from indignities and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial functions." See State ex
rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (1957).
222. The Ammerman court's treatment of State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947),
also supports a narrow interpretation of its holding. The court noted that the judicial procedure rule
at issue in Arnold "modified the statute and ...

prevailed over the . . . statute." 89 N.M. at 311,

t
551 P.2d a 1358. This language is inconsistent with the view that the statute was void, as beyond
the authority of the legislature.
223. SeeAmmerman, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006. The
newsman's privilege struck down in Ammerman is a classic example. Not only does the court's
view that all privileges are procedural represent a distinct minority view, see J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 207, at 501-13, but the important substantive implications surrounding the
establishment of a privilege are self-evident. Privileges hamper the truth-determining process in that
they are intended to serve substantive results extrinsic to litigation; they are not designed to achieve
a more truthful and effective result in the litigation process. See id. at 501-19. Indeed, it has been
pointed out that:
Rules of privilege keep out of litigation relevant and material information. They
do so because of a substantive policy judgment that certain values-such as
preserving confidential relationships-outweigh the detrimental effect that excluding the information has on the judicial truth-finding process. In short, rules
of privilege reflect a substantive policy choice between competing values, and
this policy choice is legislative in nature.
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
That is not to say that the Ammerman court was wrong in suggesting that privileges also impact
on matters of practice and procedure. Rather, it is clear, to the extent that anything is capable of
clarity in this gray area, that privileges are both substantive and procedural in real and substantial
ways. As a result, the court should not have rejected the role of the legislature without more careful
judicial analysis of the substantive aspects of the privilege.
In 1982, the supreme court adopted, as a rule of evidence, a qualified news-media privilege. See
N.M. R. Evid. 514. The rule is more carefully crafted than was the statute. The rule not only
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of Roy, which cautioned against a rigid view of separation of powers.224
Third, both cases ignore the 1933 Act and the legislative-judicial cooperation in rule-making which it fostered.225 Finally, they ignore the long
historical tradition in New Mexico of cooperative shared responsibility
between the legislature and judiciary for the development of procedure.226
The rigid doctrine of separation of powers which the opinions appear
to establish would also have serious and unhealthy consequences for the
rule of law. Under the principle of exclusivity, any statute which is deemed
procedural is unconstitutional as an encroachment on the exclusive domain
of the court. The constitutional test is resolved, therefore, by the process
of labelling the issue either as substantive or as procedural. The problem
is that, for the most part, there is no clear distinction between substance
and procedure. 227 In all but the most obvious of cases, judicial attempts
delineates specifically the facts that must be demonstrated by the party seeking to obtain the information, but also outlines the procedural steps to be followed in the trial court and on appeal. Id.
224. See State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 418, 60 P.2d 646, 660 (1936). A substantial body of law,
including Roy, recognizes the mutual interdependence of the co-equal branches of government under
our constitutional system. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8. Indeed, former Chief Justice
Payne used the occasion of his 1983 State of the Judiciary Address to remind the legislature that
disputes over legislative and judicial authority ought not be resolved by attempting to establish
"complete, absolute, or scientific separation of functions." Payne, C.J., State of the Judiciary
Delivered to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, 22 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1, 5 (Mar. 17,
1983). Rather, as the Chief Justice recognized, some overlap is appropriate, and a constructive
tension is best maintained between the branches, thereby permitting each branch to "exercise some
portion of the powers granted to the others . . .[while avoiding] a situation where any one branch
becomes subservient to the others.".Id. It is the equilibrium of this subtle balance which may have
been lost under the rigid separation of powers view expressed in McBride and Ammerman.
Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76-87 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (striking down the 1978 Bankruptcy Act as an unlawful delegation of Article III judicial
power):
But when Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in
defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or
prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that
right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. Such provisions do, in a sense,
affect the exercise of judicial power . . . to define the right that it has created.
Id. at 83.
225. The 1933 Act represents a commendable example of legislative self-restraint that is not
matched by McBride and Ammerman. The 1933 Act acknowledges that while the legislature may
legitimately play a role in formulating doctrine which is procedural, the experience and expertise
of the court merits deference when the court rejects a legislative procedure rule and substitutes a
rule of court. See supra text accompanying notes 113-27.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 20-82.
227. The hombook definition would describe substantive law as "[t]hat which creates duties,
rights and obligations," Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 258, 149 P.2d 795, 797 (1944), as distinguished from the procedural or adjective law "which pertains to and prescribes the practice and
procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective."
Honaker v. Ralph Pool's Albuquerque Auto Sales, Inc., 74 N.M. 458, 465, 394 P.2d 978, 983
(1964).
The hombook definition, however, is uniquely unhelpful to the resolution of all but the clearest
of cases. For example, in State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947), where the court
characterized the time limit for bringing an appeal as procedural, the court drew a distinction between
the right to bring an appeal and the "regulations affecting the time and manner of taking and perfecting
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the same." Id. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47. Similarly, in Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507
P.2d 778 (1973), the court assumed that the statute governing certiorari was procedural, although
again there is a reasonable argument that the statute confers jurisdiction, and therefore is substantive
in nature.
By contrast, it is interesting to note how the court has dealt with questions concerning venue in
suits against the state. The court has held that "venue may not be equated with jurisdiction," but
can be waived by failing to contest the matter. New Mexico Livestock Bd. v. Dose, 94 N.M. 68,
71, 607 P.2d 606, 609 (1980). Furthermore, the procedures for attacking venue are covered by the
N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b), and questions of proper venue are matters which involve the operation of
the court. Nonetheless, in this area-unlike the time limits for taking appeals or the procedures for
certiorari-the court has denied judicial power to order a change of venue absent statutory authority
from the legislature. Jones v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't., 92 N.M. 671, 672, 593 P.2d
1074, 1075 (1979). But see State ex rel. Southern Pacific & Transp. Co. v. Frost, 102 N.M. 369,
695 P.2d 1318 (1985) (Common law doctrine of forum non conveniens used to effect change of
venue).
Once the principle of exclusive judicial power over procedural matters is established, the resolution
of the substance/procedure debate is virtually outcome determinative. That is especially troublesome
when certain statutes so clearly involve both procedure and substance and no principled dividing
line between the two can be discerned. See infra text accompanying notes 337-49.
One case which demonstrates the inherent difficulties in this area is illustrative. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania promulgated a limited prejudgment interest rule, Pa. R. Civ. P. 238, pursuant
to its specific constitutional authority to promulgate procedural rules. See Pa. Const., art. V, § 10(C).
Subsequently, in Bullins v. City of Philadelphia, 516 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the federal
court was confronted with the question of whether the "procedural" prejudgment interest rule was
"substantive" for Erie purposes and therefore applicable in federal court. The court acknowledged
that the question of whether the rule is substantive or procedural for Erie purposes presents a different
inquiry from the question of whether it is substantive or procedural for purposes of determining the
state supreme court's promulgation power. Id. at 728. The court then held that the rule was substantive
for Erie purposes, because the application of the rule in diversity was more consistent with the intent
of the Erie doctrine to end discrimination against non-citizens and to discourage forum shopping.
Id. at 730.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld its constitutional authority to adopt the
rule, noting the distinction made by the Bullins court, and concluding that "[t]his Court should not
be prevented from exercising its duty to resolve procedural questions merely because of a collateral
effect on a substantive right." Laudenberger v. Port Authority, Pa., 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981).
Finally, in Jarvis v. Johnson, 668 F.2d 740 (1982), the Third Circuit entered the fray. It resolved
the diversity question in conformity with Bullins and also commented with approval on the Laudenberger result, while articulating a functional approach to the substance/procedure dichotomy:
A particular issue may be classified as substantive or procedural in determining
whether it is within the scope of a court's rule-making power, or in resolving
questions of conflict of laws, or in determining whether to apply state law or
federal law. These are three very different kinds of problems. Factors that are
of decisive importance in making the classification for one purpose may be
irrelevant for another. To use the same name for all three purposes is an invitation
to a barren and misleading conceptualism.
id. at 747.
Even if the substance/procedure distinction were easy to draw in a given context, it is not so clear
that substantive law is only for the legislature, and procedural law is only for the courts. Certainly,
both the courts and the legislature create substantive law. It is, for example, well-settled in New
Mexico that the courts, as developers of the common law, are free to alter common-law principles
and doctrine. See, e.g., Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982); Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1976). In each of
these cases the court has recognized that the substantive matters being decided are ultimately subject
to change by the legislature. See, e.g., Lopez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (imposing dram shop
liability); Hicks, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (abolishing sovereign immunity).
It is the premise of this article that the development of procedural law should follow an analogous
pattern: procedural matters may be addressed by the legislature but are ultimately subject to change
by the courts.
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to make a principled distinction between substance and procedure necessarily fail. The cases which follow this absolutist view of McBride and
Ammerman inevitably fail in their attempts to draw principled distinctions
between procedural and substantive law. The opinions in this area, therefore, appear to be driven more by a determination to reach a given result,
coupled with a concern for the maintenance of the previously asserted
judicial power, than by a considered application of constitutional law
principles.228

The later cases which apply McBride and Ammerman have exhibited
some unnecessary muscle-flexing by the courts.229 Fortunately, not all of
228. The result in Ammerman may well have been foreclosed as early as the adoption of the
Rules of Evidence in April 1973. The New Mexico rules were taken almost verbatim from the thenexisting draft of the federal rules. Despite the recommendation of the drafting committee that Rule
501 be subject to statutory privileges, in conformity with the federal rule and practice, see Fed. R.
Evid. 501, the supreme court deleted the provision which would have deferred to such action by
the legislature. While this action by the court reflected its attitude about the wisdom of legislative
activity in this area, in retrospect it may also have represented a prejudgment of the constitutional
question later presented in Ammerman.
Indeed, in support of its conclusion that rules of evidence are procedural, the Ammerman court
found its prior adoption of the rules of evidence "conclusive" on the matter. 89 N.M. at 310, 551
P.2d at 1357. Under this reasoning, the actions of the court in its rule-making capacity would be
immune from challenge by way of a lawsuit invoking the court's adjudicative power.
The court of appeals uncovered a further area of concern in State v. Thoreen, 91 N.M. 624, 578
P.2d 325 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 91 N.M. 610,577 P.2d 1256 (1978). In the context of his otherwise
successful appeal from a conviction for fraud, Thoreen claimed that the lower court had denied him
due process by the grant of immunity to a defense witness. The court denied the claim, but questioned
the validity of N.M. R. Crim. P. 58, which authorizes the district court to grant immunity: "Its
validity is questionable because: (a) immunity from prosecution is qualitatively different from the
privilege not to testify discussed in Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcasting,Inc.; and (b) the granting
of immunity from prosecution is a legislative function." 91 N.M. at 627, 578 P.2d at 328. The
appeals court declined to consider the point under the doctrine of Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M.
717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973), which precludes the court of appeals from rejecting a supreme court rule.
If adoption of Rule 58 as a rule of procedure is "conclusive" of the procedural nature of the subject,
see Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357, then the issue of whether Rule 58 is an invalid
attempt to establish substantive law by rule of court also would be unreviewable.
229. A mere hint of just how far reaching the exclusivity rationale could be came less than a
year after Ammerman in a wholly unrelated context. In State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 536, 565 P.2d 1053
(Ct. App. 1977), a child appealed a commitment order which resulted from an amended petition to
revoke probation. The child claimed that a prior increase in the length of probation followed by the
subsequent commitment pursuant to the revocation amounted to prohibited double punishment. The
state countered that the double jeopardy question was not before the court because it had not been
raised below or in the docketing statement on appeal. Doe responded that, by statute, the defense
of double jeopardy may not be waived and may be raised at any time. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A1-10 (1953 Comp.) (now codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-10 (1978)).
The court noted that this latter assumption "raises the question of whether [the statute] is unconstitutional, in that it is a legislative attempt to regulate court procedure." 90 N.M. at 539, 565 P.2d
at 1056. While the court avoided the question by finding the double jeopardy question properly
before the court for review on other grounds, the suggestion of an Ammerman problem whenever
one invokes a statutory right which touches in any way on court procedures indicates just how far
the exclusivity rationale of Ammerman could reach.
Indeed, Judge Sutin has suggested that under the doctrine of Ammerman the supreme court's
power "is absolute, not relative," Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 176 584
P.2d 1310, 1316 (Ct. App. 1978)(Sutin, J., concurring specially). In Judge Sutin's view, the court's
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the decisions after McBride and Ammerman have applied the exclusivity
23
principle which those opinions established. On balance, the most recent
decisions reflect a reconsideration of the need for or the desirability of
exclusive judicial power to adopt procedural rules. The cases constitute
an emerging movement back to the shared-responsibility position which
New Mexico traditionally followed.
D. Post-Ammerman Cases: A Return to Shared Responsibility
Despite the determination in McBride and Ammerman that procedural
" ' is an exclusive function of the judiciary,
rule-making for the courts 23
subsequent decisions continue to vacillate between that view and the more
restrained view of shared legislative and judicial power. The decisions
are not always consistent, but a pattern has emerged. The exclusive
judicial function rationale has been preserved for two categories of cases;
those which involve statutes which trench on the "essential functions"
of the judiciary, and those in which testimonial privileges are involved.
In all other cases involving legislative attempts to play a role in setting
judicial procedure the court has withdrawn from the McBride/Ammerman
dictum that the legislature is devoid of all rule-making power.. Instead,
the opinions on the general subject of rule-making are evolving toward
the view that the legislature may adopt statutes regulating procedure,
subject to the authority of the court to promulgate contrary rules which
supersede such legislative enactments.
1. The Essential Function Cases
The strongest assertion of exclusive judicial power after Ammerman
came in Mowrer v. Rusk,232 decided by the supreme court in 1980. Mowrer
absolute power to promulgate rules of evidence and control procedure in the courts extends to the
publication of court opinions, thus controlling the publication rights of the press,.and thereby denying
a judge of the court of appeals "the right to 'freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects."' Id.
230. See text accompanying footnote 299-327, infra.
231. The supreme court has declared that the Ammerman doctrine does not apply in administrative
cases until the jurisdiction of the courts is properly invoked under the applicable statute. Angel Fire
Corp. v. C.S. Cattle Co., 96 N.M. 65, 634 P.2d 202 (1981). In Angel Fire, the court drew a sharp
line between procedures "within the judicial system" after jurisdiction is established, and those
which attach to the process of obtaining jurisdiction:
[Tihe statute here establishes an administrative procedure for taking a case or
controversy out of the administrative framework into the judicial system for
review. Jurisdiction of the matters in dispute does not lie in the courts until the
statutorily required administrative procedures are fully complied with. The
courts have no authority to alter the statutory scheme, cumbersome as it may
be.
Id. at 66, 634 P.2d at 203. Administrative cases are, by definition, special statutory proceedings to
which judicial rule-making authority does not extend. See supra, note 4.
232. 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886 (1980).
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was an unusual case. It dealt not with the traditional clash concerning
rule-making power but with issues that are totally outside the scope of
judicial procedure. It cited neither Roy nor Ammerman. Yet, it broadly
defended the judiciary from what the court perceived to be a serious
intrusion upon the power of the judicial branch of government to protect
its essential control over its own staff.
In Mowrer, municipal court judges challenged the validity of a city
ordinance which gave the city's chief administrative officer the power to
hire and to supervise court personnel.233 The ordinance also required
executive approval of the judicial budget prior to submission to the city
council.234 The supreme court overcame a difficult mootness problem in
order to reach the merits of the claim.235 The court held that the doctrine
of separation of powers barred the executive branch from controlling the
hiring of court personnel236 and prevented the executive from reviewing
the judicial branch budget prior to its submission to the legislative branch. 7
The analysis in Mowrer began with the assertion that, although the
233. Id. at 48, 618 P.2d at 686. See Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances § 3-1-13 (1979).
234. Id. at 50, 618 P.2d at 890.
235. Id. at 52, 618 P.2d at 890. In 1979, the New Mexico Legislature enacted N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 34-8A-1 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1980), which abolished the Albuquerque Municipal Court and replaced
it with a new metropolitan court which was to come into existence in July 1980. Thus, the case
went to trial in the district court in 1979 challenging a local statutory scheme which had been
superseded, although the effective date was some months away. The lower court ruled that the case
was not moot and proceeded to the merits of the case. Mowrer, 95 N.M. at 50, 618 P.2d at 888.
The supreme court conceded that the new statute creating the metropolitan court gave metropolitan
judges authority over personnel and budgetary processes, id. at 51, 618 P.2d at 889, and acknowledged
that under the New Mexico Declaratory Judgment Act an actual controversy had to have existed at
the time the action was filed in the trial court, id.; see also N.M. Stat. Ann. §§44-6-1 to -15 (1978).
Finding that there was an actual controversy when Mowrer was filed, the court went on to conclude
that even though the case had subsequently become moot, it was proper for the appellate court to
consider the cause under the "substantial public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine. 95
N.M. at 51-52, 616 P.2d at 889-90.
236. Mowrer, 95 N.M. at 55, 618 P.2d at 893. "Personnel directly employed by the courts cannot
constitutionally be included in a general merit system or ordinance." Id.
237. Id. at 50-51, 618 P.2d at 888-89.
We also hold that any municipal ordinance or any portion of any municipal
charter, or indeed any statute, which requires that the judiciary first submit its
requested budget to the mayor or any part of the executive branch of government
prior to submitting the same to the legislative branch of government is unconstitutional as violative of Article III of the Constitution of New Mexico.
Id.
In this portion of its "holding" the court goes well beyond the municipal ordinance question
before it and speaks to "any statute which requires . . . [judicial budget submission] to . . . any
part of the executive branch of government." The ruling in Mowrer thus would apply to nullify the
statute requiring that the supreme court submit its budget to the State Department of Finance and
Administration prior to submission to the legislature. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-7 (Repl. Pamp 1983)
requires each state agency to submit a budget to the state budget division which budget "shall be
subject to the approval of the state budget division." Another statute defines "state agency" as "any
department. . . of government." N.M. Stat. Ann. §6-3-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1983); see also N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 34-6-35 (1978).
The real issue is not the question of prior submission, but rather of executive power to alter or
to amend judicial budgets. Prior submission to the executive might be appropriate to allow for
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line of demarcation of separation of powers may be difficult to perceive,
an independent judiciary must possess rights and powers consistent with
its status as a branch of government equal to the executive and legislative
branches.238 Included among those rights is the power to protect itself
against any impairment of its prerogative by the conduct of the other
branches.239 After detailing how the ordinance would place control over
court personnel in the executive branch and, thereby, remove it from the
judiciary, the court concluded that the ordinance was tantamount to giving
the executive "the power to coerce the judiciary into compliance with
the wishes or whims of the executive.'24°
The court found substantial authority for the proposition that the judiciary must, as a matter of separation of powers, maintain control of its
own personnel.24' It concluded that the ordinance was an unconstitutional
attempt to limit the inherent power of the court.2 42 Similarly, the court,
following a parallel body of authority,2 43 held that the budget submission
requirement was unconstitutional because "any requirement that the judicial branch first submit its budget request to the executive branch dilutes
and could render impotent the inherent power of the judiciary. 244
Mowrer transcends the issue of the rule-making power. It involves
more fundamental issues and seeks to protect the essential independence
and ability of the judiciary to perform its essential tasks. Mowrer declares,
in no uncertain terms, that whenever another branch of government asserts
a power which, if exercised, could "render impotent" or even "dilute"
the essential powers of the courts, the supreme court will void such an
act on separation of powers grounds.245
alteration of executive department budgets to maintain total budget balances or as a trigger mechanism
for negotiation between the executive and the judiciary to garner executive support for the judicial
budget. Neither of those objectives in any way subverts or undermines judicial independence, yet
the ruling in Mowrer seems to preclude the enforcement of such submission requirements.
238. 95 N.M. at 53, 618 P.2d at 891.
239. Id. at 54, 618 P.2d at 892 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193,
197, (Pa.) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971)). The court also decided, as a preliminary matter, that
the separation of powers strictures of article III apply to municipal courts. The court reasoned that
the common source of all judicial power is found in article VI, § 1, of the constitution, that it
expressly includes all inferior courts created "in any district, county or municipality of the state,"
and that article III bars any infringement "upon the power and the authority of the judiciary . . . at
any level of state or local government." 95 N.M. at 52, 618 P.2d at 890.
240. Mowrer, 95 N.M. at 55, 618 P.2d at 890. The court may have been discussing matters more
theoretical than real. Establishment of "administrative" authority over personnel in someone other
than the judge only poses a threat to the independence of the judiciary if the executive officer
exercises that authority contrary to the desires of the judge. It is therefore the potential for executive
interference with the judicial function, in addition to the reality of such interference, which is
constitutionally forbidden under the doctrine of Mowrer.
241. See id. at 55, 618 P.2d at 893.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 56, 616 P.2d at 894.
244. Id. Again, the potential for executive interference, rather than any actual or even alleged
interference, triggers the constitutional principal articulated here. See supra note 240.
245. 95 N.M. at 56, 61 P.2d at 894.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

It is difficult to fault the court for failing to apply the flexible approach
of shared responsibility to those legislative enactments which impair the
essential functions of the court. The problem, however, is that the "essential function" rubric defies precise definition.246 As a result, judicial
authority to determine when such functions are undermined by legislation,
represents uncabined discretion to enhance judicial power at the expense
of the legislature. Fortunately, since Mowrer, the court has demonstrated
247
admirable restraint in not overusing the "essential function" doctrine.
Indeed, in two cases decided after Mowrer the court decided separation
of powers issues in a manner that reflected sensitivity to legislative prerogatives and to the need for avoiding use of the "essential function"
doctrine if at all possible.
In State v. Mabry,24 the supreme court demonstrated that the "essential
function" rule is a two way street that sometimes requires a surrender of
judicial power in order to allow the legislature to carry out its essential
functions. In Mabry, the court applied reasoning similar to the "essential
function" doctrine articulated in Mowrer249 to hold that the courts may
not assert or use an inherent judicial power to suspend sentences when
to do so would interfere with an explicit legislative scheme calling for
mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes.25 The significance of
246. There is no bright line distinction between functions which are essential and thus require
exclusive judicial control, and those which are not essential and thus may be amenable to legislative
direction. The resolution of such questions requires a careful evaluation of the facts and circumstances
of a particular case, in which the court must also weigh the competing institutional values involved.
This is not the only area of the law where the courts must grapple with the difficulties in an
"essential function" standard. The United States Supreme Court, for example, recently abandoned
the "traditional governmental functions" test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) which had been formulated to determine the extent of state immunity from federal legislation
passed pursuant to Congress' commerce clause authority. The Court in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) overruled Usery, holding "unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on
a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'" Id.
at 1016.
The Garcia Court found state sovereignty constraints on federal power were adequately protected
"by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system." Id. at 1018. The New
Mexico Supreme Court, on the other hand, can rely on no such "political process" protection to
assure that the fundamental interests of the judiciary are not invaded by the legislature. Thus, the
delicate judicial balance must be weighed in each given instance, despite the inability of the court
to articulate a principled distinction between essential and non-essential judicial functions.
247. Mowrer itself is hardly a model of restraint. See supra note 235.
248. 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269 (1981).
249. 95 N.M. 98, 618 P.2d 886 (1980). In Mowrer, the court framed the issue in terms of the
judiciary's need to exercise the "inherent power of a constitutional court to sustain its own independent
existence." Id. at 56, 618 P.2d at 894. In Mabry, the court upheld the sentencing statute "as a
necessary incident" of the legislature's exclusive power to establish penalties for criminal behavior.
State v. Mabry, 96 N.M. 317, 321, 630 P.2d 269, 273 (1981). Though the operative language differs
in the two cases, the principle established is the same.
250. Mabry challenged a mandatory sentence statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-3(A)(1978), updated by 1977 Laws of New Mexico, ch. 216. He asserted that the statute encroached on the trial
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Mabry is twofold. First the court could have, but did not enhance its own
power by asserting that the power to suspend sentences was a "essential
function" of the judiciary which required that mandatory minimum sentencing statutes be declared void. On the contrary, the court enhanced
legislative power at the expense of the judiciary. Second, the court acknowledged that not all statutes which touch on the inherent power of
courts to carry out judicial functions must fall. To ensure that ultimate
power over sentencing resides in the legislature, the legislature may "place
some restrictions on the ability of the judiciary to avoid imposing legislatively-mandated penalties for crimes by indefinitely suspending sentences."25 Third, like Mowrer, Mabry lies outside the direct line of cases
traced in this article. None of the cases in the Roy/Ammerman line was
discussed or cited in Mabry. The essential function cases are doctrinally
separate from the cases dealing with the powers of the court and legislature
to write rules of procedure. 5 '
Mabry also suggests that the court will be careful not to overuse the
essential function category to expand judicial power. A court so sensitive
to the legislative prerogative to set sentences, is unlikely to broaden
unduly the essential function test in order to escape from the better reasoned and more reasonable approach to shared rule-making power which
the court is currently developing in cases not involving essential functions.
The decision in Gonzales v. Atnip 53 exhibits the same sensitivity to
the need for restraint when offered an unnecessary opportunity to expand
the "essential function" category. In Gonzales, the court of appeals affirmed a district court order enforcing an oral settlement against the
plaintiff's claim that to do so would violate the provisions of the Release
court's inherent power to suspend sentences in the court's discretion, 96 N.M. at 320, 630 P.2d at
272. The supreme court assumed the existence of the common law power of courts to suspend
sentences, but concluded that the common law power must give way to the legislative power to set
sentences, including minimum sentences.
251. 96 N.M. at321, 630 P.2d at 273.
252. One case could be read to overlap the essential function cases and those dealing with the
rule-making power. In State
ex rel. Bliss v.Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957), the
court declared that the power of a court to punish for contempt "is inherent in the courts and its
exercise is the exercise of the highest form of judicial power." Id. at 161, 315 P.2d at 227. Having
determined, in effect, that the power of contempt was an essential function "found in the separation
of powers," id., the supreme court nonetheless conceded that "the power of the courts to punish
for contempt is not absolute, exclusive and free of all legislative regulation." 63 N.M. at 162, 315
P.2d at 227. Reasonable legislative regulation of matters within the inherent powers of the courts
are valid, declared the court. Id.
Bliss affords an opportunity for the supreme court to avoid the "all or nothing" results which the
essential function cases now require. Instead of declaring all legislative acts void which have the
potential to touch upon an essential judicial function as the court did in Mowrer, the supreme court
might, in the future, legitimate legislative attempts to regulate inherent judicial powers, at least
where the statutory regulation "preserve[s] to the court sufficient power to protect itself from indignation and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial functions." 63 N.M. at 162, 315 P.2d
at 227. For a further discussion of Bliss, see supra text accompanying notes 152-64.
253. 102 N.M. 194, 692 P.2d 1343 (Ct. App. 1984).
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Act.254 The court rejected the plaintiff's reading of the statute,255 and held
that the act does not apply to settlements made during the course of a
lawsuit by an attorney specifically authorized to settle the case.56
The court reached that conclusion by applying settled principles of
statutory construction. The plaintiff claimed that the act applies to "all"
settlements, and that its applicability is subject to no limitations. 57 The
court noted that such an interpretation might encroach on the court's
inherent "supervisory control over their dockets""25 and therefore, construed the act to avoid that constitutional clash. The court "presumed
that the Legislature, in enacting the statute, has performed its duty of
keeping within constitutional bounds" '59 and read the act as inapplicable
to the case at hand. 2" This construction avoided the constitutional problem.
Gonzales demonstrates that established principles exist to avoid unnecessary clashes between the legislature and judiciary even when legislation touches upon the essential functions of the court. By resort to
statutory construction principles which enforce a presumption in favor of
the validity of legislative actions, the court often can protect its essential
integrity and still avoid the Ammerman-like clashes which undermine the
essential working relationship among the branches of government.
In one class of cases the court is likely to continue to use the "essential
function" characterization to assert exclusive rule-making power. Regulation of the practice of law, including admission to the bar and disciplining of lawyers261 is likely to remain within the exclusive province of
the courts despite early precedent suggesting that the subject was one in
which the legislature had a legitimate if subordinate role.
254. The Release Act permits a person to disclaim settlements obtained by medical providers by
way of a release under certain conditions. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-1-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
255. The plaintiff argued that the act applies to "any" settlement agreement, and that "any" had
been construed in another context to mean "all." As a result plaintiff urged that the act applies to
all settlements, including the one here negotiated by counsel while the case was pending. Gonzales,
102 N.M. at 198, 692 P.2d at 1347.
256. Id. at 200, 692 P.2d at 1349.
257. Id. at 198, 692 P.2d at 1347.
258. Id. at 198-99, 692 P.2d at 1347-48 (quoting Birdo v. Rodriquez, 84 N.M. 207, 210, 501
P.2d 195, 198 (1972)).
259. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 80, 28 P.2d 511 (1933)).
260. Id. at 199, 692 P.2d at 1348.
261. The supreme court once distinguished between the power to regulate admission to the bar
and the power to discipline or disbar attorneys. In State ex rel. Wood v. Raynolds, 22 N.M. 1, 4,
158 P. 413, 414 (1916), the court declared that "the right to admit to practice and to suspend or
disbar are distinct, the former depending upon the [existence of a] statute and the latter an inherent
right in all courts of superior jurisdiction." More recent cases and statutes no longer make that
distinction. See e.g., Application of Sedillo, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162 (1959) (legislature may
not provide for admission to bar of persons not entitled to admission in accordance with rules
established by court); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (unlimited grant of authority
to regulate all facets of the practice of law).
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Prior to statehood, the legislature extensively regulated both the criteria
for admission to the bar and the disciplining of lawyers. 262 In 1916, the
supreme court decided that the legislature might have a role to play in
the setting of criteria for admission to the bar, but the power to discipline
and suspend attorneys was "an inherent right in all courts. 2 63 Thereafter
the court softened its stance somewhat. In cases preceding Roy, the court
seemed to acknowledge the legitimacy of a legislative role in the regulation of the practice of law while seeking to prevent the legislative branch
from encroaching on the ultimate power of the court to regulate the
profession. In re Gibson2" is illustrative. Because Gibson failed to pay
the license fee imposed by the State Bar Act of 1927,265 the Board of Bar
Commissioners suspended him from the practice of law. Gibson argued
before the supreme court that the State Bar Act was unconstitutional for
several reasons; it was an invalid tax, it improperly compelled him to
become a member of the bar association, it constituted special legislation,
and it delegated judicial power to the Board over the suspension power
in violation of principles of separation of power. 2' The court found no
fault with most of the legislation because statutes regulating the legal
profession were found to be "a valid exercise of the police power over
an important profession. , 267 Only the section of the statute authorizing
the Board to suspend persons for non-payment of fees was held unconstitutional. That provision, declared the court, was an impermissible attempt to "confer the judicial power of suspension and disbarment" on
the Board in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.268
Having thus fixed the power to discipline attorneys as a judicial power,
the court considered the source of the judiciary's power to do so. With
ambivalence typical of the era preceding Roy, 269 the court noted that
because one section of the State Bar Act 270 conferred plenary disciplinary

power on the supreme court, it was unnecessary to decide whether the
statutory language merely was "intended as a disclaimer of intention on
262. See supra text accompanying notes 54-65.
263. State exrel. Wood v. Raynolds, 22 N.M. 1, 4, 158 P. 413, 414 (1916). In 1928, the supreme
court reaffirmed that "the disbarring of an attorney is a strictly judicial function" and held that
legislation purporting to authorize the Board of Bar Commissioners to disbar an attorney independent
of the approval of the supreme court was void. In re Royall, 33 N.M. 386, 268 P. 570 (1928).
264. 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643 (1931).
265. Laws of 1927, ch. 113 which modified the State Bar Act of 1925, Laws of 1925 ch. 100.
The 1925 Act imposed a $5 annual license fee on attorneys, created a Board of Bar Commissioners,
and conferred extensive powers on the Board. The 1927 amendments granted the Board the power
to suspend from practice attorneys who did not pay the annual fee. See 35 N.M. at 556, 4 P.2d at

647.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 561-574, 4 P.2d at 649-654.
Id. at 557, 4 P.2d at 647.
Id. at 565, 4 P.2d at 651.
See supra, text accompanying notes 70-82 and 113-27.
Laws of 1925, ch. 100, §6, discussed at 35 N.M. at 565, 4 P.2d at 651.
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the part of the Legislature to deprive the supreme court of any part of its
inherent power, ' or was, instead, a legislative declaration investing
the court with power.272
In 1941, in an action that paralleled its action in the procedural rulemaking field in 1933,273 the legislature adopted a statute which declared
that the supreme court "shall by rules . . . define and regulate the practice
of law in New Mexico. "274 The passage of the statute was followed by
an increased willingness on the part of the court to free itself from any
legislative constraints in the regulation of the legal profession. In Application of Sedillo,275 the supreme court declared invalid a statute which
sought to create an exception276 to the court's rule that only graduates
from accredited law schools could enter the bar.277 The court determined
that the legislature could not undermine the minimum standards set by
the court for admission to the bar by creating exceptions.278 Any attempt
to do so must fail as an unconstitutional invasion by the legislature upon
the judicial power. 279 The court did not use the occasion to entirely exclude
the legislature from a role in setting criteria for admission to the bar.
Instead it conceded that the legislature may have sufficient interest in the
competence of lawyers28 ° to set minimum standards for admission to the
bar though it cannot undercut a judicial determination to add additional
requirements beyond those imposed by the legislature.281
Since the decisions in McBride and Ammerman, the court has been
271. 35 N.M. at565, 4 P.2d at651.
272. Id. The court merely concluded that the statute was a legislative "declaration" of plenary
power whether or not the declaration created the power. Id.
273. Laws of 1933, ch. 84, § 1.
274. Laws of 1941, ch. 96 § 1, now compiled at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
275. 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162 (1959).
compelled the court toadmit topractice long term
276. Laws of 1957, ch. 106, § 1.The statute
residents of New Mexico who had studied law in a law office for three years and had practiced
before certain federal administrative bodies for a lengthy period of time.
277. The court rule was initially proposed by the Board of Bar Commissioners, for final approval
by the court. 66 N.M. at 269, 347 P.2d at 163. The court, by then, had concluded that the Board,
though a creation of the legislature, was actually operating not by authority granted by the legislature,
but by authority "supplemented, if not completely embraced, by the adoption by the supreme court
of its rle" empowering the Board to act on behalf of the judiciary. Id. The unresolved issue as to
the source of the Board of Bar Commissioner's authority was finally resolved in 1979 when the
legislature enacted a statute declaring that the board of bar commissioners and the board of bar
examiners were "bodies of the judicial department and are not a state agency," N.M. Stat. Ann.
§36-2-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), though the thrust of the statute is directed at allocating financial
responsibility rather than resolving separation of powers disputes. See id.
278. 66 N.M. at 271-272, 162 P.2d at 164-65 (quoting with approval from Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949)).
279. Id.
280. The court did not, in Sedillo, identify the legislative interest. In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550,
557, 4 P.2d 643, 647 (1931), however, had anchored the legislative power in the "exercise of the
police power over an important profession [which has] immemorially . . .exercised a great and
enduring influence upon the business, social and political life of the people."
281. 66 N.M. at271-272, 162 P.2d at164-65.
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increasingly bold in its declarations concerning the power of the judiciary
over the entire field of the regulation of the practice of law. For example,
recent cases dealing with the regulation of the unauthorized practice of
law have unequivocally declared that "the authority of the supreme court
to define and regulate the practice of law is inherently contained in the
grant of judicial power to the courts by the Constitution," 2"2 and that the
283
court "has the exclusive right to regulate the practice of law."
Significantly, none of the cases dealing with the regulation of the
practice of law rely upon McBride or Ammerman as authority for their
exclusive judicial power holdings. The court clearly views this issue as
being outside the line of decisions dealing with the rule-making power
which are exemplified by McBride and Ammerman. Instead, the court
treats these cases as "essential function" cases. It is because the regulation
of the practice of law is intimately tied to the ability of the court to
administer its judicial functions effectively, that the court has declared
the subject to be within the exclusive control of the judicial branch of
government.
2. Testimonial Privilege Cases
In two opinions dealing with attempts to create testimonial privileges
by other branches, the supreme court reaffirmed its broad declaration in
Ammerman that only the court has the authority to create testimonial
privileges.
In State ex rel. Attorney General v. FirstJudicialDistrictCourt,2 84 the
attorney general claimed a privilege concerning official documents relating to his investigation of the causes of the 1980 New Mexico State
Penitentiary riots. In response to discovery attempts by various civil
plaintiffs and criminal defendants, the attorney general asserted three
privileges: executive privilege, public interest privilege, and privilege
based on federal law. The supreme court denied the claim of public interest
privilege285 and found inapplicable any privilege based on federal law.286
The court, however, did acknowledge a qualified, constitutionally-based
executive privilege.
The court began its analysis with a restatement of the Ammerman
principle that the creation of rules of evidence, including privileges, is
282. State Bar of New Mexico v. Guardian Abstract and Title Company, Inc., 91 N.M. 434,
439, 575 P.2d 943, 948 (1978).
283. United States v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 423, 684 P.2d 509 (1984).
284. 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981).
285. Id. at 259, 629 P.2d at 335. The asserted privilege "protects communications between private
individuals and government officials." Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334. The court concluded that there
was no constitutional basis for the existence of such a privilege in this state. Id. at 259, 629 P.2d
at 335.
286. Id. at 260-61, 629 P.2d at 336-37.
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an inherent judicial function because such rules "are part of the judicial
machinery administered by the courts." 28 7 The court noted that New
Mexico Rule of Evidence 501 recognizes this fact by declaring that the
constitution and rules of the supreme court are the only two legitimate
sources of testimonial privileges.288 The court decided that the attorney
general could assert executive privilege because such a privilege is implicit in the New Mexico Constitution, which acknowledges his power
as an independent executive officer.289 Finding no similar authority in the
constitution and no court rule creating a public interest privilege, the court
rejected that claim as in conflict with Rule 501.'90
First Judicial District reinforced the exclusive power of the court to
establish testimonial privileges by holding that the only New Mexico
authority beyond the supreme court itself which could create a testimonial
privilege was the state constitution. The opinion is distinguishable from
the court's treatment of Ammerman, however, because the legislature had
played no role in the attempt to create a public interest privilege. The
attorney general was relying not on a statute granting the privilege but
on an argument that the constitution implicitly required the existence of
a public interest privilege.
291
The privilege issue presented to the court in Maestas v. Allen replicated the Ammerman conflict between the legislature and judiciary and
reached the result dictated by Ammerman. Maestas involved a paternity
suit brought by the State Department of Human Services to recover reimbursement for state welfare expenditures and to establish the father's
responsibility for future support.2 92 When the state sought discovery from
the putative father relevant to the issue of paternity, Maestas asserted a
privilege against responding based on the state statute which declares that
in paternity actions the mother and alleged father "shall be competent,
but not compellable, to give evidence." 2 93 The court held that the statute
was either an improper attempt to create an evidentiary privilege or an
inappropriate attempt to assert the constitutional fifth amendment privilege
287. Id. at 257, 629 P.2d at 333.
288. Id. See N.M. R. Evid. 501.
289. 96 N.M. at 257-58, 629 P.2d at 333-34. "The executive department is independent within
its own sphere and has the implied rights vested in it by the Constitution in order to maintain its
independence. Inherent in the successful functioning of an independent executive is the valid need
for protection of communications between its members." Id.
290. Id. at 259, 629 P.2d at 335. The court rejected the argument that the substance of a "public
interest privilege" could be found in Rule 510 (informant privilege) or Rule 502 (disclosures to
government required by law). Id.
291. 97 N.M. 230, 638 P.2d 1075 (1982).
292. Id. A New Mexico statute authorizes "third parties furnishing support or defraying the
expenses" to sue to enforce the parent's duty to support. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-5-4 (Repl. Pamp.
1983).
293. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-5-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
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"because there is no criminal liability that a non-spouse faces for failure
to support unless

. . .

he violates a court order." 94

In rejecting the legislature's attempt to create an evidentiary privilege,
the court identified Ammerman as the leading authority and applied it to
hold the statute invalid.295 The court, however, did not discuss or apply
the broad statements in Ammerman which declare all attempts by the
legislature to establish procedural rules to be void. Instead, the decision
applied the more limited rationale that "[a]ny conflict between our rules
and statutes that relate to procedure must be resolved in favor of the
'
rules." 296
The court declared that the statute, if it sought to create a
privilege, "must fail because it is in conflict with ...New Mexico's
Rule of Evidence 501. "297
FirstJudicialDistrictmay be distinguishable from Ammerman because
it did not involve a legislative attempt to create a privilege and Maestas
may have focused on the more conciliatory reading of Ammerman. Whatever the rationale, however, the result in every testimonial privilege case
decided by the supreme court or the court of appeals, 298 has been the
same: only privileges inherent in the constitution or created by the court
in the Rules of Evidence are valid.
3. Other Procedural Issues: The Emerging General Rule
While the results in the privilege cases uniformly favor the judiciary's
power, the same cannot be said for rules of evidence other than privileges.
For example, the court of appeals, in State v. Herrera,2 99 interpreted
Ammerman in a manner which resulted in upholding a statutory rule of
evidence.
Herrerainvolved a challenge to a statute which declared that, "[a]s a
294. 97 N.M. at 231, 638 P.2d at 1076.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. In Salazare v. St. Vincent Hospital, 96 N.M. 409,631 P.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1980), the plaintiff
in a medical malpractice action appealed from the lower court's refusal to allow him to depose a
member of the malpractice panel. The defendants claimed that the panel member's testimony was
privileged on the basis of the portion of the Medical Malpractice Act which provides that "[t]he
deliberations of the panel shall be and remain confidential." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-20 (1978), and
under the rules of the Commission. See Salazar, 96 N.M. at 412, 631 P.2d at 318. The court of
appeals rejected both arguments holding that neither the act nor the rules create a privilege which
precludes the deposing of a panel member with respect to the matters which are otherwise properly
discoverable. Id. The court, however, declared that:
if any portion of the Medical Malpractice Act or its internal operating rules
could be construed to grant such a privilege, it would be an invalid provision.
Such a notion of statutorily-created privilege was emphatically dispelled by the
pronouncement of our Supreme Court in Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcasting,
Inc.
Id.
299. 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978).
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matter of substantive right" in rape cases, "evidence of the victim's past
sexual conduct

. . .

shall not be admitted" except under certain circum-

stances. 3" The defendant, charged with rape, sought to introduce evidence
forbidden by the statute. The defendant claimed that the statute could not
bar the evidence because the statute was void as an impermissible attempt
by the legislature to promulgate a rule of evidence contrary to the decision
in Ammerman.
A unanimous court of appeals upheld the validity of the statute. Judge
Wood, writing for the court, rejected the legislative categorization of the
statute as "substantive" and determined that the statute did "regulate the
admission of evidence" and, therefore, as a provision affecting "practice
and procedure, .
pertains to matters within the control of the Supreme
Court. "301

Despite the fact that it found that the statute dealt with an issue of
procedure, the court rejected the defendant's argument that Ammerman
required the court to declare the statute void. Instead of accepting the
assertion that procedural rule-making was exclusively the province of the
supreme court, the court held that the power was shared by the legislature
and the judiciary until there is a conflict between a statute and a rule.
"While a statute regulating practice and procedure is not binding in the
Supreme Court, it nevertheless is given effect until there is a conflict
between the statute and a rule adopted by the Supreme Court. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc. .

.

. State ex rel. Anaya v.

McBride."30 2 The court concluded that the legislative provision of evidence did not conflict with a judicial rule and, therefore, held that though
"the legislation may not be binding upon the Supreme Court [it] is to be
given effect until a conflict exists. "3o
300. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
301. Herrera, 92 N.M. at 12, 582 P.2d at 389.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 13, 582 P.2d at 390. Since Herrera, the court of appeals has consistently followed
the conflict approach, reserving the exclusive judicial power rationale solely for the resolution of
cases involving testimonial privileges. See supra text accompanying notes 284-98.
In Prieto v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 94 N.M. 738, 616 P.2d 1123 (Ct. App. 1980), the
court was confronted with the question of whether failure to serve a complaint immediately upon
issuance of process requires dismissal of the action. The parties focused their attention on the
interpretation of the relevant statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-13 (1978) (process shall issue immediately and shall be deemed the commencement of the action.). Id. at 741, 616 P.2d at 1126. The
court held that under the statute' delay in service alone is not sufficient to reinstate the statute of
limitations bar. Id. at 741, 616 P.2d at 1126. The court went on, however, and found that N.M. R.
Civ. P. 3 and 4 are later court rules which would control service of process questions were there a
conflict. Id. The court, in dicta, expressed the view that the statute had no further usefulness "because
Rules 3 and 4 cover the subject and they are, therefore, exclusive." Id.
More recently, in Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1984), rev'd in part,
102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985). the court continued to view Ammerman as applicable only
when a statute conflicts with an existing procedural rule promulgated by a court. Otero involved an
attack on the validity of the Medical Malpractice Act provision requiring the filing of claims before
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The supreme court denied certiorari in Herrera3 °" and, thus, did not
review the court of appeal's interpretation of Ammerman. In its most
recent decision applying Ammerman, however, the supreme court tilted
toward the interpretation of Ammerman provided by Judge Wood in Herrera. In State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan,3 °5 a district court judge refused
to honor a notice of peremptory challenge seeking to disqualify him from
presiding at trial. The judge asserted that the fifty-year-old statute authorizing peremptory challenges 3" and the judicial rule providing the
mechanism for exercising the challenge" 7 were both invalid. The supreme
court determined that the statute had both substantive and procedural
ramifications. The substantive right embodied in the statute was the "right
to a fair and impartial tribunal," as guaranteed by provisions of the state
and federal constitutions.308 The procedural aspect of the statute provided
that an affidavit, charging in conclusionary language that the party believed the judge could not be impartial, was sufficient evidence to disqualify the judge."° In a rule of court adopted in 1982, the supreme court
provided a different and even easier procedure for disqualification. The
rule provided that "the statutory right to disqualify" could be accomthe malpractice tribunal as a precondition to the filing of an action for damages. Id. at 496, 697
P.2d at 496. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The plaintiffs, who had failed
to file before the tribunal, claimed, inter alia, that the act violated separation of powers because the
statute deals with procedures in judicial proceedings which "the Legislature lacks authority to
regulate." Id. at 502, 697 P.2d at 502. On this point, the court assumed that the act deals with
procedure, but concluded that the violation of separation of powers arises only "[w]here the legislation
conflicts with procedure adopted by the Supreme Court." Id. In the absence of such conflict, however,
the court mandated that "the legislation is to be given effect." Id. (citing Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582
P.2d 384).
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, held more to its exclusivity line in reversing with respect
to plaintiff's claim against the doctor. See Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 486, 697 P.2d 482, 486
(1985) ("The [Medical Malpractice Act] provision that claimants against health care providers first
submit their claims to the commission before filing suit is a purely procedural requirement and
cannot, therefore, be deemed binding.").
304. 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978).
305. 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984).
306. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978). The statute was originally adopted in 1933. Act of Mar.
17, 1933, ch. 184 1933 N.M. Laws 502.
307. N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The parallel rule applicable in civil cases was
N.M. R. Civ. P. 88 (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
308. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335. The court found that the right was anchored
in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; the New
Mexico constitutional provision guaranteeing due process, N.M. Const. art. II, § 14; and the explicit
constitutional provision covering disqualification of judges, N.M. Const. art. VI, § 18. 100 N.M.
at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335.
309. The statute authorized disqualification when a party filed an affidavit stating that "according
to the belief of the party making the affidavit [the judge cannot] preside over the action or proceeding
with impartiality." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978). In State ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough, 75
N.M. 702, 410 P.2d 732 (1966), the supreme court concluded that the absence of impartiality could
be equated with the constitutional mandate that a judge not preside at a trial "in which he has an
interest." See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 18. Thus, the statutory ground for disqualification is rooted
in the constitutional provision.
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plished without an affidavit by merely filing a "notice of disqualifica"
tion. ",3
In Gesswein, the supreme court did not void the procedural aspects of
the disqualification statute but merely assumed that these statutory provisions had been superseded by the more liberal provisions of the courtcreated rule. The court concluded that "the current procedure under the
statute and rule present. . . significant problems," due to the great number
of peremptory challenges filed, and the resulting "burden on the system..'.. To remedy the situation, the court decided to revoke and rewrite
the rule of court which had liberalized the process set out in the statute
for exercising the statutory right to challenge a judge.3" 2 Contemporaneously with its Gesswein opinion the court issued new, stricter rules
requiring that, in order to exercise the "statutory right to disqualify," the
party must file an affidavit which must "state sufficient facts showing the
bias, prejudice or intent of the judge being disqualified." 3" 3 At the same
time, the supreme court adopted rules of court314 which modified the
statutory provision31 5 governing the assignment of a different trial judge
to the case after a successful disqualification.
Gesswein resulted in substantial changes in the disqualification law of
310. N.M.,R. Crim. P. 34.1 (Cum. Supp. 1983) [now superseded].
311. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338. The court cited statistics showing that in
1981-82 "over 2000 district court disqualifications were filed in the course of one year," and
concluded that the "increasing number of disqualifications constitutes an unreasonable burden on
the system." Id. The rationale behind this conclusion is that a great number of disqualifications
disrupt the orderly administration of the judicial system. Id.
The court, however, failed to show how those numbers translated into actual disruption. There
are a number of factors, other than the raw numbers, which might bear on the extent of the burden
imposed by disqualifications. Those factors include: (1) the number of disqualifications in multijudge districts; (2) the proportional spread of those disqualifications among the judges in a given
district; (3) projected increases in recusals which may result from a tightening of the ability to
disqualify; and (4) the statistics on court calendar congestion in relation to disqualifications. Further
consideration, in light of these factors, might show that the number of disqualifications involved do
not significantly burden the system.
In the absence of any explanation of what those burdens were, the decision in Gesswein appears
to be based more on the potential for disruption rather than the actuality. Compare supra note 240.
The best course would be for the court neither to act on abstract possibilities, nor to refrain from
acting until the system is about to fall, but rather to seek a middle ground-overriding statutory
procedures only when the problem rises to substantial proportions. See, e.g., Solberg v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 561 P.2d 1148, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1977) (suggesting that the court can
wait to act until the problem becomes acute).
312. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338. Although the court held "that Rule 34.1 is
inappropriate and is hereby retracted," the court applied the rule to the pending case. Id. The court
followed existing precedent which holds that, like the legislature, the court is constitutionally precluded from applying new procedure rules or rulings to cases pending at the time of the ruling. See,
e.g., Marquez v. Wylie, 78 N.M. 544, 434 P.2d 69 (1967), (construing N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34).
Thus, the peremptory challenge of Judge Galvan, which complied with the existing Rule 34.1, was
allowed to stand. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338.
313. N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.1; N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1 (1985 Cum. Supp.).
314. N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.2; N.M. R. Civ. P. 88 (1985 Cum. Supp.).
315. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1978).
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New Mexico.3" 6 Remarkably, those changes were accomplished without
resort to the confrontational rhetoric contained in Ammerman. Instead of
declaring the statute void to the extent it affected procedure, the court
used its power to modify the statute3" 7 by adopting a contrary rule. The
court implied that the procedural aspects of the statute were valid until
modified by rule of court when it held that the court "can adopt a rule
of procedure when the operation of the court is involved and the existing
process has created a problem"3 8 and then applied the existing law to
the pending case until a different rule of court was promulgated.
Gesswein marks a rejection of the exclusivity argument suggested in
Ammerman and McBride and heralds a return to the traditional pattern
of accommodation between court and legislature in the rule-making field.
The decision assiduously avoids a holding based on exclusive judicial
power, recognizes a role for the legislature in rule-making, and weaves
the role of legislature and judiciary into a single fabric. Yet, it maintains
the court's prerogative to monitor and to remedy problems resulting when
procedural
statutes pose an "unreasonable burden" on the judicial sys31 9
tem.
A further mark of the ebbing of legislative-judicial discord on this
subject has followed the Gesswein opinion. The 1985 legislature adopted
a new statute which provides expressly for the right of each party to one
peremptory challenge to a district judge.32 ° Subsequently, the court reversed its prior position in Gesswein and amended rules 88 and 88.1 of
the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure and rules 34.1 and 34.2 of the
New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure to bring them into conformity
with the new act. The new rules specifically reference "[t]he statutory
right to excuse the district judge before whom the case is pending. , 321
This subsequent development evinces a welcome cooperative spirit
between the legislature and the judiciary on a matter which combines
considerations of substantive policy coupled with concerns for procedural
regularity. The legislature and court, acting in tandem, changed the law
regarding judicial disqualifications, thus avoiding squabbles over whether
the issue was substantive or procedure and whether the court alone could
change the existing law if the issue were labelled procedural.
316. An informal survey of practitioners in the Second Judicial District by the authors failed to
turn up a single successful use of the judicial disqualification statute pursuant to the new rules in
the first nine months following the Gesswein decision.
317. N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-1-2 (1978); N.M. R. Civ. P. 91. The statute and rule acknowledge
the power of the court. The power may be inherent in the judiciary. See State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397,
60 P.2d 646 (1936).
318. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337.
319. Id. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338.
320. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-9 (1985 Cum. Supp.).
321. N.M. R. Civ. P. 88.1 (1985 Cum. Supp.); N.M. R. Crim. P. 34.1(d) (1985 Cum. Supp.).
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Even when the court avoids the exclusivity approach, the way in which
conflicts between statutes and rules are resolved may be as important as
the resolution itself. The next section of this article suggests that when
a problem arises concerning the impact of a procedural statute that is not
the subject of a current court rule, the proper remedy is the adoption of
a rule different from the statute rather than a judicial declaration of invalidity aimed at the statute.322
The view that statutes governing procedure are valid but only until
supplanted by later adopted rules of procedure is within the letter and
spirit of the 1933 Act.323 It also avoids direct confrontations between the
branches of government. The only possible drawback in the use of the
approach is that the court should apply the existing statutory procedure
case and then promulgate new rules to govern subsequent
pending
to the 32
4
cases.
III. SOME PRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE
The current retreat from the extreme position that McBride and Ammerman represent is both correct and wise. It is correct because there is
no support in history or logic for the position that in New Mexico only
the supreme court may promulgate procedural rules. It is wise because
the supreme court's return to a theory of shared power with the final
authority in the court adequately protects the judiciary's interest in assuring its ability to function as an independent branch of government
while avoiding unnecessary and unfortunate clashes with the legislature.
What follows are some tentative suggestions, drawn from the supreme
court's decisions, as to the appropriate approach to take and the factors
to consider in resolving the additional issues which will inevitably arise
concerning the allocation of the rule-making power.325
322. See infra text accompanying notes 376-79. In at least one recent case the exclusive judicial power basis of Ammerman was used to invalidate a statute not involving the question of
privilege, even in the absence of a contrary rule of court. In Miller & Assocs., Ltd. v. Rainwater,
24 N.M. St. B. Bull. 65 (Jan. 3, 1985), the court held unconstitutional the statutory requirement
that actions on open accounts must be verified and answers to such actions must also be verified.
The court properly noted that the statutory requirement derived from a desire to obviate the need
for the introduction of the original entry books into evidence, and that the underlying problem had
been overcome by the new rules of evidence which allow for the introduction of summaries of such
records. Id. at 66. Rather than letting the statute remain pending promulgation of a new rule of
evidence, however, the court resorted to Ammerman and McBride and held the statute unconstitutional
as a legislative incursion into the judicial rulemaking sphere. Id. at 67.
323. See infra text accompanying notes 113-27.
324. Gesswein, 100 N.M. at 773, 676 P.2d at 1338.
325. The potential questions are legion. Among them are the following:
(1) May the court expand personal jurisdiction beyond the confines established by the legislature?
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978). CompareWorland v. Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 295, 551 P.2d
981, 985 (1976) ("Only the legislature can confer on the courts the expansion of jurisdiction allowed
by International Shoe...."), with Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum, Inc., 88 N.M. 532, 534, 543
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A. Abandon the Exclusivity Doctrine
The claim that only the judiciary may enact procedural rules has no
place in New Mexico law. The historical record demonstrates that the
court and legislature have shared the rule-making power. 326 McBride and
Ammerman contain language to the contrary,327 but that language is inconsistent with pre-existing precedent,328 and has not been consistently
followed in subsequent opinions.329

More importantly, the exclusivity argument is not necessary in order
to accomplish the legitimate goals which the supreme court sought to
achieve when it posited the theory. There can be no doubt that the judiciary
must have ultimate responsibility for rule-making if it is to function as a
co-equal branch of government. The court can assume ultimate responsibility without resort to the claim of exclusive judicial power. For fifty
years, the legislature has steadfastly conceded to the court the power to
revoke or to revise any statute affecting court procedure.330 In response,

the court has created a line of precedent confirming the legislative view
that the supreme court has the ultimate power to adopt procedural rules.33 '
The court solidly grounded that view in the constitutional requirement of
separation of powers and the constitutional grant of authority to the supreme court to exercise superintending control over the courts.3 3 2 This

"final say" power assures the independence of the judiciary and grants
P.2d 825, 827 (1975) ("we have repeatedly equated the 'transaction of business'-insofar as the
acquisition of long-arm jurisdiction under our statute is concerned-with the due process standard
of 'minimum contacts'....");
(2) May the court apply common law principles to order a change of venue when not specifically
provided by statute? Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-3-1 to -3 (1978) (requiring motion of party)
with Valdez v. State, 83 N.M. 720, 497 P.2d 231 (1972) (court may order change of venue sua
sponte). See also State ex rel. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Frost, 102 N.M. 369, 695 P.2d 1318
(1985) (applying doctrine of forum non conveniens intrastate to defeat proper venue under applicable
statute);
(3) May the court increase or decrease the number of peremptory challenges to jurors which is
set by statute? Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-14 (1978) with N.M. R. Civ. P. 38(e); and
(4) Does the district court have power to enter orders beyond 30 days from the entry of final
judgment, despite a statute which limits trial court jurisdiction to 30 days subsequent to entry of
judgment? Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-1 (1978) with Baca v. Marquez, No. CV-83-522, N.M.
Third Judicial District, filed March 4, 1985 (Memorandum Opinion of Martin, J.) (suggesting statute
is unconstitutional) (on file with New Mexico Law Review).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 13-127.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 186-230.
328. See id.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 231-324.
330. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 147 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-11 (1978)). In addition, the legislature has, on occasion, recognized that the passage of new procedural
rules has rendered obsolete certain old procedural statutes and has repealed those obsolete statutes.
See Act of April 3, 1981, ch. 115, 1981 N.M. Laws 704 (repealing procedural statutes relating to
pleading and motions).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 299-324.
332. N.M. Const. art. III, § 1; N.M. Const. art. VI, §3; e.g., State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride,
88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1978).
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the court all the authority it will ever need to prevent improper legislative
encroachment on the judicial authority over procedural matters. The power
to revoke a procedural statute by promulgating a contrary rule of court
is functionally equivalent to the power to declare a procedural statute
void on exclusivity grounds."'
Though the functional result may be the same, the "final say" formulation is superior to the exclusivity doctrine for several reasons. First,
it comports with the historical record in New Mexico.334 Second, it incorporates rather than conflicts with the legislature's view that the legislative branch has a legitimate, if subservient, role to play in the rulemaking process. 3 This approach, therefore, avoids confrontation between the branches without weakening the power of the court.
Another important reason exists for preferring the "final say" approach
to the exclusivity argument. The judiciary can only be enriched by exposure to the considered views of the legislature, embodied in a procedural
statute. The legislative arena, with its lay orientation, and its more open
fact-finding processes can sometimes enlarge the perception of problems
in the operation of the judicial system. In addition, the legislature may,
on occasion, be in a superior position to gather data and to construct a
tentative solution. The court, in turn, can either accept the legislative
solution or reject it, either immediately or after watching the statute's
operation for a time. The legislature will not often devote its energy to
rule-making, but when it does, it may well develop sound and workable
rules.336

B. Restructure the Substance/ProcedureInquiry
If the supreme court accepts the principle that the legislature and the
judiciary share procedural rule-making power, it will reduce, but not
eliminate, the need to distinguish between substance and procedure. The
333. There is one practical difference. If the exclusivity approach is used, then procedural statutes
are void and are inapplicable to the case determining their unconstitutionality. E.g., Ammerman v.
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 310, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906
(1978). If procedural statutes are valid until revoked or modified by the passage of a subsequently
enacted rule of court, then the procedural statute applies to the parties in the action in which the
applicability or wisdom of the statute is in question and to other actions filed before the court enacts
a contrary rule of procedure. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34. See State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100
N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 13-127.
335. N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-1-2 (1978).
336. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (limitations upon evidence of victim's
past sexual conduct in rape cases) (construed in State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978)); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-17 (Repl. Pamp.
1984) (authorizes use of video tape depositions of minors in sexual offense cases and authorizes the
supreme court to adopt procedural rules "to govern and implement" the statute); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-5-1 (Repl. Panp. 1982) (plaintiff in medical malpractice action may not allege dollar amount
in ad damnum clause of complaint for malpractice).
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courts337 and the legislature338 would each then have power to develop
both substantive and procedural law. There would be no need to distinguish between substance and procedure so long as conflicting rules did
not come from the separate branches of government. Were a conflict to
arise, however, the substance/procedure distinction would continue to be
significant. If the issue were substantive, the legislature's decision would
control, and the opposing judicial decision or rule would necessarily yield
to the statute.339 If the issue were procedural, the court would have the
power to choose its rule of procedure in preference to the provisions of
the procedural statute.
Where a statute and a rule conflict and the court must resolve the
substance/procedure dichotomy, the court should restructure its focus in
order to diminish the confrontational clash between coordinate branches
of government. Presently, the court focuses on the legislature's statute
" ' This
and determines whether the statute is procedural or substantive.34
approach places the judicial focus on the legitimacy of legislative action
and assumes the validity of the court's rule.
In a regime of shared power, the court should shift its inquiry from
the legitimacy of the statute to the validity of the court's rule.342 The shift
337. The power of the judiciary to create substantive law flows from N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-3
(1978), which provides for the application of the common law in the courts of New Mexico. The
courts are free to modify common law doctrines "when those doctrines become out of tune with
today's society." Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 629, 651 P.2d 1269, 1273 (1982).
338. The power of the legislature to create substantive law flows from N.M. Const. art. IV, § 1.
339. In Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981), for example, the supreme court
overruled the common law doctrine of contributory negligence and substituted the doctrine of pure
comparative negligence. The court acknowledged that the legislature had the power to change the
newly created substantive law: "We ... realize that the legislature is now in session and may wish
to address the issue." Id. at 683, 634 P.2d at 1235. See also N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-1 1-1 (1985 Cum.
Supp.) which creates a statutory cause of action against liquor dealers who serve drunk or underage
persons and provides that the statutory cause of action shall supercede the common law liability
established by case law. Compare with Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
340. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-2 (1978); N.M. R. Civ. P. 91.
341. See e.g., State ex rel. Gesswein, 100 N.M. 769, 771-72, 676 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (1984).
342. There is nothing novel about this proposed procedure. In fact, the United States Supreme
Court suggested a variation of this very approach when confronted with the similar problem of
deciding whether, in a diversity action, a state law should gain sway over the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure under the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Exhibiting frustration with the unhelpful simplicity of the substance/procedure dichotomy and the
"outcome determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Court, in
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), indicated that the validity of a federal rule, for Erie purposes,
was to be judged by different criteria based more on the governmental authority for the promulgation
of the rule: "To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it
alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's
grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling
Act." Id. at 473-74. Thus, the Court shifted the inquiry away from substance/procedure and the
outcome-determinative test to whether "the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in
their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling
Act nor constitutional restrictions." Id. at 1144.
The state-federal analogy is imperfect, of course, because the United States Supreme Court in
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in focus will diminish the sense of confrontation between the branches
but will not ease the judicial task. The supreme court must decide whether
its previous decision to adopt a rule of court was an unlawful, exercise
of the judicial power.343 The court, in effect, becomes the final arbiter of
its own power."
No simple definition of the distinction between substance and procedure
can infallibly direct the court to a correct determination of the limits of
its rule-making power.345 Indeed, the court should reject simplistic solutions, especially those which favor a finding that the rule is procedural
and, thus, within the ultimate power of the court. For this reason, it was
unwise for the court in Ammerman to bootstrap the existence of a procedure rule into conclusive proof that the rule is procedural. After stating
that the substance/procedure distinction "is often elusive," the court declared that, "[t]he very fact of adoption of the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence . . . by this Court, is conclusive of its determination that at
least these rules, as adopted, are procedural." 34' 6 In contrast, the United
Hanna affirmed federal legislative power to enact the Enabling Act, as well as the Court's power
to draft and submit the rule under that act, whereas the New Mexico Supreme Court is faced with
denying state legislative power in upholding the validity of the state rules. The focus in the Erie
context is somewhat helpful here, however, because, under Hanna, the Court shifts the focus away
from the substantive nature of the applicable state statute, and looks instead to the validity of the
rule as a proper delegation of constitutional authority under the Enabling Act. This latter approach
diminishes the threat of an ultimate clash of legislative and judicial power over the subject of rulemaking.
343. The supreme court's power to promulgate rules of procedure flows, at least in part, from
the constitutional grant to the court of superintending control over the inferior courts. See N.M.
Const. art. VI, § 3. This power of superintending control "carries with it the inherent power to
regulate all pleading, practice and procedure affecting the judicial branch of government." State ex
rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1975). No power to develop
substantive law through rule-making can be implied under this analysis. See e.g., Johnson v. Terry,
48 N.M. 253, 260, 149 P.2d 795, 798-99 (1944). Moreover, the supreme court has limited the scope
of the rules of civil procedure to non-substantive matters: "Rule 1. Scope of Rules. These rules
...
N.M. R. Civ. P. 1.
govern the procedure in the district courts of New Mexico.
In the federal system, the prohibition against changing substantive law through the rule making
process is explicit: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, . ..
the practice and procedure of the district courts. . . .Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); see Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
The same limitation exists in the 1933 act by which the legislature purported to delegate rule
making power to the supreme court. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84 § 1, 1933 N.M. Laws 84 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-1 (1978)).
344. For a discussion of the dangers inherent in the court being the final arbiter of its own power,
see infra text accompanying note 357.
345. The supreme court acknowledges that "the line between substance and procedure is often
elusive," but has attempted to define "procedural" in general terms for purposes of determining the
scope of its rule-making function: "Pleading, pre-trial, all rules of evidence (including rules of
presumption and privilege) and other trial and post-trial mechanisms, designed to accomplish a just
determination of rights and duties granted and imposed by the substantive law, are traditionally
considered to be 'adjective law' or 'procedural law.'" Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.,
89 N.M. 307, 310, 551 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). For a discussion
of the difficulty arrising from a principled distinction between substance and procedure, see supra
note 227.
346. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357.
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States, Supreme Court, confronted with a similar argument, rejected the
notion that, because court rules legitimately can affect only procedure,
all court, rules, are inevitably procedural: "The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory
Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or
consistency. ""'
The New Mexico Supreme Court should retreat from its absolutist
position in Ammerman. It should return to its prior position that the
supreme court can and should declare its rules of procedure invalid when,
on reflection, the court is convinced that they constitute "judicial legislation" and, therefore, should be void because the rule-making
power
348
"does not assume to affect substantive rights of the parties.
The fact that the court promulgated a rule pursuant to its power to
promulgate procedural rules may, in effect, create a "prima facie" case
that the disputed rule is procedural. 349 That fact, however, should not
preclude the court from taking a fresh look at the decision made in the
rule-making process when presented with the question in the context of
a disputed issue in an adversary proceeding.
C. Return to the Principlesof the 1933 Act in Allocating the RuleMaking Power
The idea of shared power over rule-making with ultimate authority in
the judiciary is not new. In 1933, the legislature determined that this
approach struck the appropriate balance between court and legislature
when it provided that procedural statutes then in existence could be amended
or revoked by subsequently adopted rules of court.350 In 1933, the supreme
court adopted a rule of procedure to the same effect. 31 The provision
347. Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946).
348. Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 260, 149 P.2d 795, 799 (1944).
349. In the context of deciding whether state or federal law should apply in a federal court when
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the Supreme Court sometimes must decide whether
a federal rule of civil procedure is substantive or procedural. In such cases, the rule of procedure
normally applies, and "the court ... can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question" is procedural.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 480, 471 (1965). See Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 253, 260, 149 P.2d
795, 799 (1944) ("it is quite understandable that the trial court in applying the rule indulged the
presumption that this court had acted within its power in adopting it.")
350. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, § 2, 1933 N.M. Laws 84 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-2
(1978)).
351.
All statutes relating to pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings
in any of the courts of New Mexico, existing upon the taking effect of the Act
of the Eleventh Legislature, approved March 13, 1933 (L. 1933, ch. 84) . . .
known as Senate Bill No. 130, and all statutes since enacted by any session
of the legislature relating to said subjects or any of them except as any of said
statutes heretofore may have been or hereafter may be amended or vacated by
order of this court, shall remain and be in effect and have full force and operation
as rules of court.
Rule of Court, 37 N.M. VI (adopted Apr. 13, 1933; effective June 9, 1933).
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now is embodied in rule 91 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure.352 The current rule accepts this division of authority, implicitly
acknowledges the legislature's role since 1933 in adopting procedural
statutes, and provides that all procedural statutes before or since 1933
"shall remain and be in effect .. . as rules of court" until they are
"amended or vacated" by order of the supreme court.353
Both branches, thus, agree on the proper allocation of rule-making
authority. The agreed-upon process embodies a spirit of cooperation,
provides additional perspectives from which to view and to remedy procedural problems, and yet absolutely assures that the judiciary will be
able to protect its independence. McBride and Ammerman threaten this
mutually agreeable partnership and unnecessarily substitute conflict and
confrontation in its place. The courts should construe those opinions
narrowly, in order to reconfirm the appropriateness of the partnership
forged in the 1933 Act and Rule 91.
D. Restrain the Use of JudicialPower To Override Procedural
Statutes
Because the court may revoke or amend a procedural statute and substitute a court-made rule,354 the court is the final arbiter of the legislature's
355
power and its own power. The court should exercise restraint and rule
in favor of its own power only when impelled to do so for significant
reasons.356 In another context, Justice Powell recently explained the need
for judicial self-restraint in defining the scope of the court's own power.
He said, "[w]ere we to utilize this power . . . indiscriminately . . we
352. N.M. R. Civ. P. 91. There is no corresponding rule in the New Mexico Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
353. Id.
354. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-2 (1978); N.M. R. Civ. P. 91.
355. [The need for prudential rules of self-governance is] found in the delicacy of
...[the function of judicial review], particularly in view of possible consequences for others . . .; the comparative finality of those consequences; the
consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power
concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to
function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts;
the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely
negative character ...
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947). The Court in Rescue Army articulated
a number of rules of self-governance "under which it has avoided constitutional questions pressed
upon it for decision," including the following:
[Such] matters will not be determined in friendly, non-adversarial proceedings;
in advance of the necessity of deciding them; in broader terms than are required
;if the record presents some other ground [for decision]; at the instance
of one who fails to show that he is injured; or if a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
Id. at 569.
356. See Justice Brandeis' venerable admonition in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 436 (1936)
that this Court reaches constitutional questions last.
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may witness efforts by the representative branches drastically to curb its
use. "357
New Mexico has already witnessed legislative attempts to curb the
power of the court because the legislature perceived that the courts improperly expanded the scope of its own power.358 Fears of legislative
reaction and a conflict between branches is not the only reason to defer
to legislative rule-making. Respect for the views of a coordinate branch
of government and a willingness to experiment with new procedures
created by the legislature until the procedures are found to be deficient
also counsel in favor of a presumption of legitimacy for legislative efforts
in the rule-making field.
Deference to legislative initiatives does not imply subservience to the
legislative will. In State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood,359 the supreme court
established a standard which should serve as a guideline for judicial
exercise of the power to revoke or to amend legislation affecting procedure. In Bliss, the court struck down a statute which sought to regulate
the procedures applicable before a court could declare a litigant to be in
contempt- of court." The court acknowledged that the separation of powers mandated by the constitution "was never intended to be complete" 36 '
357. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 191 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
The commentators have warned against the dangers which inhere in the exercise of the ultimate
power of judicial review in rule-making struggles with the legislature. Indeed, the majority of the
commentators have concluded that the exercise of exclusive judicial authority in this area ought to
be avoided. See, e.g., Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut,
8 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 41-43 (1975); Means, The Power to Regulate Practiceand Procedurein Florida
Courts, 32 U. Fla. L. Rev. 442, 443 (1980); Note, The Bounds of Power: JudicialRule-Making in
Illinois, 10 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 100 (1978); Note, The Rule-Making Power: Subject to Law?, 5 Rutgers
L. Rev. 376 (1950); Comment, An Inevitable Clash of Power? Determining the ProperRole of the
Legislature in the Administration of Justice, 22 S.D. L. Rev. 387 (1977).
Almost 30 years ago, Professors Levin and Amsterdam made the case for shared legislativejudicial authority in this area. Their arguments are as compelling today as when they were written.
See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative ControlOver JudicialRule-Making:A Problemin Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
358. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court abolished the common-law defense of contributory negligence and substituted the doctrine of comparative negligence in 1981. See Scott v.
Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). During the 1981 session of the legislature, the Speaker
of the House sponsored a constitutional amendment which he acknowledged was designed to curb
such expansive common-law judicial law making. Albuquerque Journal, Mar. 8, 1981, at A-10, col.
5. The proposed amendment provided: "The supreme court is vested with procedural rule-making
power. Matters concerning substantive law are solely within the prerogative of the legislature, and
a legislative determination that a law is substantive shall be final." H.J.R. 16, 35th Legislature, 1
Sess. (1981).
The proposal is particularly interesting because it would seem, on its face, to concede that the
sole power to promulgate procedure rules lies with the supreme court, id., which is the same position
espoused by the supreme court in Ammerman and McBride. However, by giving finality to the
legislative determination that a matter was not procedural, id., the proposed amendment would have
left the court at the mercy of an unreviewable legislative labelling process.
359. 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
360. Id. at 162, 315 P.2d at 227. See supra text accompanying notes 152-64.
361. 63 N.M.at 162, 315 P.2d at 227.
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and then established a test for determining when legislative enactments
may not interfere with the court's power to determine procedural rules:
"The practical standard is the reasonableness of the legislative regulation.
The statutory regulation must preserve to the court sufficient power to
protect itself from indignities and to enable it effectively to administer
its judicial functions." 36 2 Bliss contains two grounds for judicial modification. The first is that the court may strike legislation that may undercut
its ability to perform its essential functions.363 The second is that the court
may negate statutory procedures which interfere with the effective and
efficient operation of the courts."
1. The Rare "Essential Function" Intrusion
Legislation which the court determines threatens the judiciary's ability
to perform essential operations impinges upon the ability of the judicial
branch to perform its role as an independent branch of government.
Statutes which have this effect are invalid; the court must have the power
to declare them so even if the court has not promulgated a judicial rule
of court to the contrary. Bliss is exemplary. The court declared invalid
the legislative mandate of a jury trial for summary contempt despite the
absence of a formal judicial rule to the contrary.36 5 Mowrer v. Rusk" is
another case where the court perceived a threat to the "core function"
of the judiciary and invalidated a statute even though the statute did not
contradict a rule of procedure. In Mowrer, the supreme court declared
invalid a statute which gave the executive branch of government the power
to control personnel employed in the judicial branch of government and
interfered with the court's power to submit budgets directly to the legislature.367 Though there was no rule of court to the contrary, the court
exercised its power of nullification. In Mowrer, the supreme court determined that the statute granted the executive "power to coerce the
judiciary into compliance with the wishes or whims of the executive,"368
thus threatening the independence and integrity of the judicial branch of
government. 369
362. Id.
363. Id. at 161, 315 P.2d at 227. "[The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts
and its exercise is the exercise of the highest form of judicial power. . . . The statutory regulation
must preserve to the court sufficient power to protect itself from indignities..." Id.
364. Id. at 162, 315 P.2d at 227. "The statutory regulation must enable [the court] effectively
to administer its judicial functions." Id.
365. Id. at 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1957).
366. 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886 (1980).
367. Id. at 50, 618 P.2d at 888.
368. Id. at 55, 618 P.2d at 893.
369. Id. "The inherent power of a constitutional court to sustain its own independent existence
has always been assumed." Id. at 56, 618 P.2d at 894. The budget provision was held invalid
because it "dilutes and could render impotent the inherent power of the judiciary." Id.
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These cases and the issues raised in them are beyond the scope of the
1933 Act and Rule 91. They involve not a conflict in procedural rules
but an intrusion into the fundamental powers necessary for the operation
of an independent judiciary. The exclusivity holdings applied in these
cases must be reserved for those few situations where legislation truly
threatens the ability of the courts to function. Mere hypothetical threats
ought not be sufficient; nor should the court avail itself of the power if
the threat is not immediate.370 This power should be utilized only when
a real and immediate threat to the independence of the judiciary exists
and the court is able to articulate that threat and to explain carefully the
necessity of its action.371
2. Resolving Conflicts Between Procedural Statutes and Rules of
Court
Most situations discussed in this article do not involve significant intrusions on the fundamental powers needed by the courts to operate. They
involve clashes between procedural statutes and procedural rules which
differ in content and perhaps in underlying policy, but which do not
amount to serious disputes about essential power. Bliss correctly acknowledges the power of the judiciary to apply a rule of court contrary
to a procedural statute if application of the rule is necessary "to enable
[the court] effectively to administer its judicial functions. ,37 2 In this category of cases, the court should determine whether the statute or the rule
provides the more efficient mechanism for facilitating the correct resolution of substantive disputes. When the statute is preferable, the court
should apply the statute and incorporate it into the rules, pursuant to the
1933 Act and Rule 91. Where the rule is preferable, the court should
declare the statute to be superseded by the rule, in the manner provided
in the 1933 Act and Rule 91.
370. But see Mowrer v. Rusk, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886 (1980) (moot issues addressed); State
ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (1951) (repealed statute held unconstitutional). Perhaps, Mowrer and Bliss illustrate an unfortunate corollary rule: when there are no practical
ramifications to the court's assertion of exclusive inherent power, the court is more likely to flex its
muscles.
371. One commentator has concluded that well-reasoned decisions are a necessary check on the
personal predilections and biases of the decision-maker. R. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision 9297 (1961). In his view, reasoned decisions: (1) force the judge to evaluate his conclusions and require
him to persuade himself on external grounds of the desirability of his decision; (2) help keep open
avenues of independent criticism and verification; (3) establish reliable grounds for future action;
and (4) prevents the appearance of arbitrariness. Id.
Similarly, the nature of the judicial role requires attention to see that the decisions rendered by
our courts are principled. "A principled decision ... is one that rests on reasons with respect to all
the issues in the case, reasons which transcend any immediate result that is involved. When no
sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of any other branches
of the Government. . .those choices must, of course, survive." Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrinciples
of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1959).
372. Bliss, 63 N.M. at 162, 315 P.2d at 227.
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E. The Formal Rule-Making Process as the Preferred Forumfor
Resolving Conflicts
The supreme court's rule-making power is not exercised in the caldron
of litigation. The court has several standing committees which consider
amendments to rules, evaluate the necessity and wisdom of rule changes,
and submit proposed rule changes to the court for final approval and
promulgation.373 The rules committees should be alert for the existence
of statutes regulating procedure which are inconsistent with proposed
rules of procedure and should seek to resolve conflicts between proposed
rules and existing statutes pursuant to the methods set forth in the 1933
Act and Rule 91.374 The rules committees provide an ideal vehicle for a
consideration of the relative merits of an existing statute and a proposed
rule. The issue can receive the focused attention of the committee and
the court, free from extraneous factors often present in the litigation
process. Furthermore, the committees and court may gather relevant data
from any source to assist their deliberation. They are not limited to the
briefs and arguments presented by the parties in adversary proceedings,
in which the resolution of the rule/statute issue is not an end in itself but
only a means to achieve victory. Finally, the committees may hold hearings or otherwise solicit views and thereby obtain the input of all persons
interested in the outcome of the issue.375
373. Sup. Ct. Misc. Rule 8, "Supreme Court Committees" Aug. 1, 1985, provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Authority to appoint.The supreme court may appoint standing committees and special or temporary committees to make recommendations to the
court and/or to assist the court in drafting and revising rules and instructions
of the supreme court.
(h) Rule-making Procedure.
(3) If new rules or amendments are recommended to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Supreme Court Rules Governing Discipline, Disciplinary Board,
Revised Rules of Procedure, Rules Governing the New Mexico Bar, Rules
Governing Bar Examiners, Bar Examinations and Admission to the Bar, or the
Code of Judicial Conduct, said recommendations will be submitted to the
President of the New Mexico State Bar prior to the court's final action on such
proposal in order to provide for input from the bar. Upon final enactment by
the court on such rules or amendments, they shall be submitted for publication
by the State Bar at least 45 days prior to the effective date. If the supreme
court determines that it is necessary to have a different effective date than that
provided for in this paragraph, it shall so provide in its order of adoption.
374. The committees could fulfill another important role. When the New Mexico statutes are
periodically recompiled, the compilers apparently make ad hoc decisions of whether existing statutes
have been superseded by subsequent adoption of rules of procedure. See, e.g., N.M. R. Civ. P. 18,
Compiler's Notes ("This rule is deemed to have superseded 105-406 C.S. 1929, which was substantially the same.") The determination that a conflict exists and that the rule supersedes the statute
should be made by the committees and the court when the rule is adopted.
375. For a discussion of the need to inject public processes into the judicial rule-making authority,
see J. Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures 87 (1977); Weinstein, Reform of Federal
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1976); Parness & Manthey, Public Process
and Ohio Supreme CourtRulemaking, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 249 (1979).
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Where a rule of court is already in effect and a contrary statute is
adopted, litigation is not always necessary to resolve the conflict. Upon
passage of the statute, the appropriate committee could meet to evaluate
the statute."6 If the committee concluded that the statute was procedural,
the committee could then decide whether to incorporate the new statute
into the rules of court pursuant to Rule 91 or whether to reject it by
proposing a contrary rule of court or by standing firmly in support of an
existing rule of court that conflicts with the statute. An active and invigorated committee process could, in this way, act to resolve potential
conflicts between the legislature and judiciary before they come to a head
in litigation challenging the validity of a statute on the grounds that it
dealt with judicial procedure. Over time, perhaps the legislature itself
would acknowledge the role of the Rules Committees which the legislature's 1933 Act made possible. Instead of developing judicial procedure
through the cumbersome process of adopting a statute which the legislature acknowledges can be modified by the court, perhaps the legislature
would submit proposed rules changes directly to the committees for consideration and promulgation as rules of court.
IV. CONCLUSION
A survey of the history of procedural rule-making in New Mexico
discloses a pendulum-like pattern of development. Initially, the legislature
asserted power over rule-making for the courts, and the courts acceded
to that power. Early on, however, the legislature began delegating the
rule-making power to the courts, and the courts exercised that authority
within the framework of the legislative delegation. In the 1930's, influenced by national developments in this area, two events shifted the existing balance. First, the legislature abrogated its authority to write binding
procedural rules for the courts, and second, the court decided that it had
inherent, if not exclusive, authority to engage in rule-making, independent
of legislative-delegated authority. Thereafter, the supreme court consolidated its inherent rule-making power, including its authority to override
legislative enactments which conflicted with court-created rules. The outer
swing of the pendulum in favor of judicial power came in the 1970's
when the court asserted that its inherent power over rule-making was
exclusive, leaving no role at all for the legislative branch. While the
exclusive judicial power cases have not been overruled, the most recent
376. The Committee will usually have adequate time to consider the value of the newly adopted
statute before it becomes applicable in judicial proceedings. Normally, laws go into effect "ninety
days after the adjournment of the legislature enacting them." N.M. Const. art. IV, § 23. Legislation
declaring that immediate applicability is "necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health
or safety" goes into effect immediately upon approval of two-thirds of the vote of each house. Id.
Presumably, procedural statutes will seldom have so weighty a public impact. Even those that do
bear an emergency clause cannot be applied to cases pending on the date of passage. N.M. Const.

art. IV, § 34.
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cases sound a judicial retreat toward the view that the rule-making power
is a shared power, with the court having ultimate authority where conflicting procedural rules are promulgated by the two branches.
The recent movement away from the exclusivity rulings of the 1970's
is to be applauded, and, indeed, the court should go further and adopt a
series of prudential constraints to lessen the tension between court and
legislature over this issue, while attempting to remove, to the extent
possible, rule-making concerns from the litigation process. The court
should restrain the use of its ultimate power to override procedural statutes, using it only when necessary to protect essential judicial functions,
or when the statutory procedure is inefficient and the court has designed
and promulgated a better judicial rule in its place. Finally, the court should
recognize that lawmakers may offer a helpful perspective on rule-making
problems, and that a formal rule-making process, open to the members
of the legislature, the bar and public alike, provides the best method for
the formulation and alteration of procedural rules.

APPENDIX A: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE STATES
Jurisdictions with Specific Constitutional Provisions
Establishing Separation of Powers
State
Alabama

ConstitutionalProvision
Ala. Const. art. III, §43: "In the government of
this state, except in the instances in this Constitution
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall
never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men."

Arizona

Ariz. Const. art. III: "The powers of the government
of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three
separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this
Constitution, such departments shall be separate and
distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the
others."
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Ark. Const. art. IV, § 2: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Colorado

Colo. Const. art. III: see Ariz. Const. art III, quoted
supra (substantially the same).

Connecticut

Conn. Const. art. II: "The powers of government
shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them is confided to a separate magistracy,
to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those
which are executive, to another; and those which
are judicial, to another."

Florida

Fla. Const. art. II, § 3: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Georgia

Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, (qar) 3: see Ariz. Const. art.
III, quoted supra (substantially the same).

Idaho

Idaho Const. art. V, § 13: "The legislature shall have
no power to deprive the judicial department of any
power or jurisdiction which rightly belongs to it."

Illinois

11. Const. art. II, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Indiana

Ind. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Iowa

Iowa Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Kentucky

Ky Const. § 28: see Ariz. Const. art. III, quoted
supra (substantially the same).

Louisiana

La. Const. art. II, §2: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Maine

Me. Const. art. III, §2: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Massachusetts

Mass. Const. art. 30: see Ala. Const. art. III,§ 43,
quoted supra.

Michigan

Mich. Const. art. III, § 2: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Minnesota

Minn. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).
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Mississippi

Miss. Const. art. I, § 1: see Conn. Const. art. II,
quoted supra.

Missouri

Mo. Const. art. II, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Montana

Mont. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Nebraska

Neb. Const. art. II, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Nevada

Nev. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

New Hampshire

N.H. Const. Pt. I, art. 37: "[T]he three essential
powers . . . ought be kept as separate from, and

independent of, each other, as the nature
government will admit, or as is consistent
chain of connection that binds the whole
the constitution in one indissoluble bond
and amity."

of a free
with that
fabric of
of union

New Jersey

N.J. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

New Mexico

N.M. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Oklahoma

Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1: see Ala. Const. art. III,
§43, quoted supra.

South Dakota

S.D. Const. art. II: "The powers of the government
of the state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative executive and judicial; and the
powers and duties of each are prescribed by this
Constitution."

Tennessee

Tenn. Const. art. II, §2: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Texas

Tex. Const. art. II, § 1: see Conn. Const. art. II,
quoted supra.

Utah

Utah Const. art. V, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

Vermont

Vt. Const. ch. II, §5: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).
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Virginia

Va. Const. art. III, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

West Virginia

W. Va. Const. art. V, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same, with added
phrase: "nor shall any person exercise the powers
of more than one of them at the same time, except
that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the
legislature").

Wyoming

Wyo Const. art. II, § 1: see Ariz. Const. art. III,
quoted supra (substantially the same).

APPENDIX B: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE STATES
Jurisdictions in Which Procedural Rule-Making
Is Exclusively a Judicial Function
I. Based on Separation of Powers Alone
State
Seminal Case
Idaho
R.E.W. Construction Co. v. District Court, 88 Id.
426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965).

Massachusetts

Police Commissionerv. MunicipalCourt, 374 Mass.
640, 374 N.E. 2d 272 (1978).

New Jersey

Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406
(1949) (N.J. Const. art. VI, §2, (qar) 3, which
provides that supreme court "shall make rules . . .
subject to the law [on] practice and procedure in all
• . . courts" means subject only to common law).

New Mexico

Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M.
307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
906 (1978).

H. Based on a Specific ConstitutionalRule-making Provision
State
ConstitutionalProvision
Arizona
Ariz. Const. art. VI, §5(5): "The Supreme Court
shall have ...

[p]ower to make rules relative to all

procedural matters in any court."
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Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21: "The supreme court shall
make and promulgate rules governing

. . .

practice

and procedure in civil and criminal cases, except
that the [legislature] shall have the power to provide
simplified procedures in county courts for claims not
exceeding five hundred dollars and for the trial of
misdemeanors."
Delaware

Del. Const. art. IV, § 13: The Chief Justice has the
power "[u]pon approval of a majority of the Justices
of the Supreme Court to adopt rules for the . . .
conduct of the business of. . . all the courts in this
state . . ." except that all courts may make their

own supplementary rules.
Hawaii

Hawaii Const. art. V, §6: "The supreme court shall
have power to promulgate rules . . . which shall

have the force and effect of law."
Kentucky

Ky. Const. § 116: "The Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe . . . rules of practice and

procedure for the Court of Justice."
Michigan

Mich. Const. art. VI, §5: "The supreme court shall
by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts."

North Dakota

N.D. Const. art. VI, § 3: "The supreme court shall
have authority to promulgate rules of procedure,
including appellate procedure, to be followed by all
the courts of this state; and unless otherwise provided by law, to promulgate rules and regulations
for the admission to practice, conduct disciplining,
and disbarment of attorneys at law."

Pennsylvania

Pa. Const. art. V, § 10: "The Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts,
• . . consistent with the Constitution . . . and [so

long as they do not] suspend nor alter any statute of
limitation. All laws shall be suspended to the extent
that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under
these provisions."
West Virginia

W. V. Const. art. VIII, §3: "The supreme court
shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases
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and civil and criminal proceedings, civil and criminal for . . .all of the courts . . .relating to . . .

practice and procedure, which shall have the force
and effect of law."
III. Based on Legislatively Delegated Power (Independent of Inherent
Judicial Power)
Statutory Provision
State
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 4, § 8: "The Supreme JuMaine
dicial Court shall have the power to prescribe, ...
the forms of process, rules for writs, pleadings and
motions and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law ....

[AIll laws in conflict therewith

shall be of no further force or effect." See id. at § 9
(authority to promulgate criminal rules).
Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat. §2.120(2) (1981 repl. pg): "The
supreme court ... shall regulate ... practice and
procedure. . . . Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge

or modify any substantive right and shall not be
inconsistent with the constitution of the State of Nevada."
New Mexico

N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-1-1 (1978): "The supreme
court of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated
by it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice
and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts
of New Mexico .... "

Rhode Island

R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (1956): "The supreme court,
...[and] the superior court may .

.

. promulgate

rules for regulating practice and conducting business
therein. Such rules relative to practice and procedure
.. . shall supersede any statutory regulations with
which they conflict." See also Dyer v. Keefe, 97
R.I. 418, 198 A.2d 159 (1964) (judicial rule-making
power only that conferred by statute).
Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (Rep. Vol. 1977): "The
Supreme Court . . . has power to prescribe, alter

and revise, by rules, for all courts of the State of
Utah,. . . the practice and procedure [of those courts]
shall be of
[A]ll rules in conflict therewith ..

no further force and effect.
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Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2.04.190 and 2.04.190
(1961): "The supreme court shall have the power to
prescribe . . .by rule . . .procedure to be used in
all suits.

IV. Based on InherentJudicial Power and Separationof Powers
Principles
State
Authority
Arkansas
Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373
(1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 862 (1982).

APPENDIX C: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE STATE
Jurisdictions Which Share Rule-Making Authority Between
the Legislature and the Court
I. FinalAuthority in the Legislature
State
Authority
Alabama
Ala. Const. amend. 328, § 6.11: "The supreme court
shall make and promulgate rules ... governing
practice and procedure in all courts. . . .These rules
may be changed by a general act of state-wide application."
Alaska

Alaska Const. art. IV, § 15: "[The supreme court]
shall make and promulgate rules governing practice
and procedure in civil and criminal cases inall courts.
These rules may be changed by the legislature by a
2/3 vote of the members elected to each house."

California

Cal. Const. art. 6, § 6: "To improve the administration of justice [the judicial Council] shall ...
make recommendations to the Governor and Legislature [and shall] adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with
statute . ..."

Florida

Fla. Const. art. V, § 2: "The supreme 'court shall
adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all
courts .... These rules may be repealed by general
law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership
of each house of the Legislature."
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Georgia

Grindle v. Eubanks, 152 Ga. App. 58, 262 S.E.2d
235 (1979) (court has power to enact rules not inconsistent with statutes).

Iowa

IowaConst. art. V,§ 14: "It shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to provide . . . for a general system of practice in all Courts of this State." But see
Iowa Civil Liberties Union v. Critell, 244 N.W.2d
564 (Iowa 1976) (courts have supplementary power
to fill in gaps in legislative rules).

Kansas

Bourne v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 209
Kan. 511, 497 P.2d 110 (1972) (courts have inherent
power to adopt rules of procedure, subject to statutory enactments).

Louisiana

La. Const. art. 5, § 5(A): "[The supreme court may
establish procedural and administrative rules not in
conflict with law. . ....

Maryland

Md. Const. art. IV, § 18(a): "The Court of Appeals
• . .shall adopt rules concerning the practice and
procedure .. .which shall have the force of law
until rescinded, changed, or modified by the Court
of Appeals or otherwise by law."

Missouri

Mo. Const. art. 5, § 5: "The supreme court may
establish rules relating to practice, procedure and
pleading for all courts. . . .Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or part by a law limited
to the purpose."

Montana

Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(3): The Supreme Court
"may make rules governing . . .practice and procedure for all other courts . . .Rules of procedure
shall be subject to disapproval by the legislature in
either of the two sessions following promulgation."

Nebraska

Neb. Const. art. V, § 25: "[T]he supreme court may
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all
courts not in conflict with laws governing such matters."

New York

NY. Const. art. VI, § 28 creates a judicial board to
advise the legislature in its supervision of the court
system, and the appellate division of the supreme
court (trial courts) has authority to make rules to
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supplement the statutes. See Revegno v. Lush, 257
N.Y.S.2d 406, 45 Misc. 2d 579 (1965).
North Carolina

N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13: "The General Assembly
may make rules of procedure and practice [in original courts], and . . . may delegate this authority
[retaining the power to] alter, amend, or repeal
....

any rule of procedure or practice adopted by the
Supreme Court. .... "

Ohio

Ohio Const. art. IV, §5(B): "The supreme court
shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state. .

.

. Such rules take

effect on the following first day of July, unless prior
to such day the general assembly adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval."
Oklahoma

Oregon

South Carolina

Okla. Const. art. 7, §5: "The

. .

. appellate courts

[rules] shall be as provided by rules of the Supreme
Court until otherwise provided by statute." See also
Oklahoma County Sheriffs v. Hunter, 615 P.2d 1007
(Okla. 1980) (legislative rule controls when a court
rule conflicts with a statute).
Wright v. Lane County District Court, 16 Or. App.
284, 517 P.2d 1208 (1974) (the court may promulgate a rule which covers for government of the court
which is not controlled by statute).
S.C. Const. art. V, §4: "The Supreme Court shall
make rules [subject to statutory law] governing the
practice and procedure in all . . . courts." See also

S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-950 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (rules
must be submitted to legislature, and become law
90 days thereafter unless disapproved by resolution
of both houses).
South Dakota

S.D. Const. art. V, § 12: "The Supreme Court shall
make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing .

.

. all courts .

. .

. These rules may be

changed by the Legislature."
Tennessee

Tennessee Department of Human Services v. Vaughn,
595 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. 1980) (court rules concerning
practice are law until superseded by legislation, or
further court rule legislatively approved by both houses
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-3-404 (Repl. Vol. 1980)).
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Texas

Tex. Const. art. 5, § 25: "The Supreme Court shall
have power to make and establish rules of procedure
not inconsistent with the laws of the State . .. ."

Vermont

Vt. Const. art. 2, § 37: "The supreme court shall
make rules of practice or procedure. . . . Any rule
adopted by the Supreme court may be revised by
the General Assembly."

Virginia

Va. Code §8.01-3 (1984) allows the court to promulgate rules subject to modification by the legislature, and the Court has acceded to the legislative
power in this area. See Raiford v. Raiford, 193 Va.
221, 68 S.E.2d 888 (1952).

Wisconsin

Wis. Const. art. 7, §22: "The legislature . . . shall
provide for the appointment of commissioners [who
shall adopt] rules of practice, pleadings, forms and
proceedings [for the court] subject to [the legislature's] modification and adoption. ... ."

Wyoming

State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court, 399 P.2d
583 (Wyo. 1965) (courts have inherent power to
prescribe rules of practice and procedure consistent
with the constitution and legislative enactments).

H. FinalAuthority in the Courts
State
Illinois
People v. Cox, 82 Ill.2d 268,412 N.E.2d 541 (1980)
(legislature may make rules, but judicial rules control where there is a conflict only in matters within
court's authority).
Indiana

Neeley v. State, 261 Ind. 434, 305 N.E.2d 434 (1974)
(legislature may validly supplement supreme court
procedural rules, but court rules predominate in cases
of conflict).

Minnesota

State v. Keith, 325 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1982) (court
rules take precedence over any statutorily created
rules in matters of procedure rather than substance).

Mississippi

Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975)
(court will defer to legislative judgment "unless determined to be impediment to justice or impingement
upon the constitution").

